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I. INTRODUCTION
A few years ago, the New York Times published a cartoon with the
caption "Free a Death Row Inmate! It's fun! It's cheap! It's educa-
tional! It's shockingly easy!,"1 a spoof on the wave of student-assisted
exonerations of prisoners based on post-conviction deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) testing. Beneath the caption, a sequence of drawings de-
picted children combing for prospective clients through advertise-
ments in glossy magazines and raising funds through bake sales. 2
Tongue-in-cheek aside, this cartoon reflects the notion that working
on behalf of an innocent prisoner has gripped the popular imagina-
tion. As demonstrated by the recent proliferation of law school inno-
cence projects designed to assist wrongfully convicted inmates,3 there
is also a sense that such work can be "educational" and, depending on
the nature of the specific enterprise, not necessarily cost-prohibitive(though perhaps not "cheap").4 Moreover, the growing demand for
1. N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2000, § 4 (weekend), at 6.
2. Id.
3. For purposes of this Article, I will define a law school innocence project as an in-
house law school clinic, or an organization somehow affiliated with a law school,
that is devoted to the post-conviction representation of prisoners on claims of ac-
tual innocence or wrongful conviction. There are currently more than twenty-five
of these projects across the country. See Jan Stiglitz et al., The Hurricane Meets
the Paper Chase: Innocence Projects New Emerging Role in Clinical Legal Educa-
tion, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 413, 415 n.4 (2002); see also Univ. of Wisconsin Law
School Innocence Project, Innocence Projects 2001 (unpublished report, on file
with author) [hereinafter Wisconsin Report]. This Article will not examine other
types of innocence projects, such as those associated with journalism schools. For
a discussion of the role that journalists might play in this area, see Rob Warden,
The Revolutionary Role of Journalism in Identifying and Rectifying Wrongful
Convictions, 70 UMKC L. REV. 803 (2002).
4. Projects that focus on DNA claims could bear significant expenses considering
that DNA analysis may cost $2,500 to $5,000 per case. See Teresa Johnson, Or-
ange County's Innocence Project, ORANGE COUNTY L., Dec. 2001, 18, at 19. Al-
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these projects may signify that students perceive the work to be fulfil-
ling and "fun," on some level, a chance to work in criminal defense
without the moral ambiguity many people may associate with repre-
senting factually guilty clients.5
Nevertheless, "shockingly easy" is a phrase not often linked to in-
nocence projects. First, even if an inmate's case involves biological ev-
idence that could be appropriate for DNA testing, the evidence is often
difficult to locate and many states do not have statutes that expressly
provide for post-conviction testing.6 Second, in the vast majority of
criminal cases, there was never any biological evidence to begin with
and, thus, nothing is available for testing. In such cases, prisoners
typically must not only find newly discovered evidence that proves
their innocence through more taxing means-interviewing trial wit-
nesses, searching for exculpatory information withheld by the prose-
cution, and canvassing neighborhoods-but may also face onerous
time restrictions in the pursuit of post-conviction remedies.7 In juris-
though some jurisdictions explicitly provide funding for these tests, the inmate or
the organization often must "front" the costs. See Ellen Yankiver Suni, Ethical
Issues for Innocence Projects: An Initial Primer, 70 UMKC L. REV. 921, 925 n.19
(2002).
5. See Eva S. Nilsen, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and
Prejudice, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 36-37 (1994) (noting that whereas guilt or
innocence should be irrelevant to a criminal defense lawyer given the obligations
of zealous advocacy, "it would be simplistic to say that the student's perception of
the client's guilt or innocence has no effect on what she does or how she feels").
Abbe Smith has explored the dichotomy between a criminal defense attorney's
relationship to the truth in situations where her client is almost surely guilty and
those in which she is quite possibly innocent. In the former, defense lawyers sel-
dom dwell on the truth because "most criminal defendants are not innocent, and
the truth is usually not helpful to the defense," yet in the latter "there is a stun-
ning change of perspective .... Suddenly, there is nothing more important than
the truth...." Abbe Smith, Defending the Innocent, 32 CONN. L. REV. 485, 511-
12 (2000).
6. Prior to 1999, only two states, New York and Illinois, had statutes authorizing
post-conviction DNA testing. As of the end of 2002, however, more than half of
the states had such statutes. See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE:
WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND How TO MAKE IT RIGHT 319 (2001); http:ll
www.innocenceproject.org/legislation (last visited Jan. 10, 2003). Moreover, the
U.S. Congress is considering legislation that would provide post-conviction DNA
testing in certain situations. Innocence Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 912/S. 486,
107th Cong. (2001).
7. Post-conviction remedies could be available at the federal and/or state level de-
pending on the nature of the claim and the jurisdiction. Pursuing a remedy
through filing a federal habeas corpus petition may be a possibility in some ac-
tual innocence cases, but procedural requirements implemented by the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) may pose formidable
barriers. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2244, 2254 (2001). Moreover, the United States Su-
preme Court has held that a claim of actual innocence does not comprise a ground
for federal habeas corpus relief without the existence of an independent constitu-
tional violation. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993); see also Arleen Ander-
son, Responding to the Challenge of Actual Innocence Claims after Herrera v.
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dictions where statutes of limitations do not pose insurmountable ob-
stacles, pursuing an innocence claim years after a conviction has
occurred still means grappling with foggy memories and long-dormant
investigative leads.
Given the wide array of law school cultures and clinical resources,
it is no surprise that innocence projects can and do take many differ-
ent forms. Several schools have largely student-run volunteer projects
with minimal faculty supervision, while others have full-fledged in-
house clinics directed by faculty members.8 Yet another law school
model places students at a local public defender organization and
fuses that externship placement with an in-house classroom compo-
nent.9 Programs also vary in the kinds of cases they handle; for exam-
Collins, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 489, 492-98 (1998) (discussing the Herrera decision in
detail). Seeking redress through state post-conviction procedures that allow for
hearings based on newly discovered evidence may also be problematic. For in-
stance, Alabama requires that a motion must be filed within thirty days for a new
trial on the basis of"[n]ewly-discovered evidence, material for the party applying,
which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the
trial." ALA. CODE § 15-17-5(a)(5) (2001). Statutes of limitations surface in the
DNA testing context as well. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 925.11(1)(b) (2001) (provid-
ing that unless facts were unknown or could not have been found with due dili-
gence, two-year statute of limitations for post-conviction DNA testing or petition
by October 1, 2003, whichever comes later, applies); Kathy Swedlow, Don't Be-
lieve Everything You Read: A Review of Modern "Post-Conviction" DNA Testing
Statutes, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 355, 362-64 (2002) (mentioning time limits on filing
in some DNA testing statutes). For a discussion about time restrictions on state
motions based on newly discovered evidence, see Jennifer Boemer, In the Interest
of Justice: Granting Post-Conviction Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing to In-
mates, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1971, 1979-81 (2001), and Josephine Linker
Hart & Guilford M. Dudley, Available Post-Trial Relief After a State Criminal
Conviction When Newly Discovered Evidence Establishes "Actual Innocence," 22
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 629, 632-33 (2000).
8. See Wisconsin Report, supra note 3.
9. For a school that would like to implement an innocence project but for which, due
to resource and faculty coverage issues, an in-house clinic would not be feasible, a
combination of externship placements with a classroom component might be an
effective solution. For instance, the Kentucky Innocence Project is a joint venture
of the state Department of Public Advocacy, two law schools, and one social work
graduate program through which students work with public defenders in extern-
ships and also engage in classwork. See Wisconsin Report, supra note 3; http:/
www.uky.edu/Law/admissions/pubint.html (last updated Jul. 24, 2001). This ap-
proach could optimally combine the best attributes of externships, such as the
chance for students to experience life in a "real" law office, with the educational
rigor of a traditional law school class. See Norman Fell, Development of a Crimi-
nal Law Clinic: A Blended Approach, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 275 (1996). There may
be other ways for innocence projects to utilize the local defense bar short of form-
ing an official externship program. The Innocence Project at Thomas M. Cooley
Law School works in conjunction with a panel of Michigan attorneys who have
volunteered to handle cases pro bono. Naseem Stecker, Cooley's Challenge, MICH.
B.J., June 2001, 26, at 27. The Cooley Innocence Project was structured so that
law students and faculty would prepare a case for litigation and then have one of
the participating attorneys actually litigate it. Id.
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ple, some clinics are restricted to claims only involving DNA testing or
those stemming from a particular geographic region.'O Despite the
differences between law school innocence projects, however, they tend
to share a common emphasis on (1) seeking the release of prisoners
whom members of the project believe to be innocent of the crimes for
which they have been convicted and for whom there are few other al-
ternatives for legal representation,l while (2) simultaneously provid-
ing a first-rate educational experience for students.12
The prospect of taking on an innocence case can be alarming for
students and faculty alike. And the reality that handling such a case
is never easy and, in fact, may require years of hard work dictates that
case selection is of critical importance. 13 Indeed, this Article exam-
ines one of the main challenges facing any newly formed law school
innocence project: finding suitable cases. First, this Article addresses
the practical considerations inherent in case selection.14 How does
the project define its intake criteria and tap into a source of potential
clients? Should the project look at all types of claims or just those
with distinct characteristics? What is the precise procedure for devel-
oping a pool of inmate candidates and evaluating inquiries? What role
do ethical concerns play in selecting cases? Next, this Article explores
the pedagogical issues related to law school innocence projects and as-
sesses whether these projects are appropriate vehicles to serve the
10. See Wisconsin Report, supra note 3; Stiglitz et al., supra note 3, at 421-30.
11. Stiglitz and his colleagues note that "inmates have no right to counsel beyond the
initial appellate process," and the United States Supreme Court has explicitly
found that indigent criminal defendants lack the right to counsel for state habeas
corpus proceedings. Stiglitz et al., supra note 3, at 414.
12. See id. at 421, 430. The Texas Innocence Network (TIN) at the University of
Houston Law Center, for example, declares that
[t]he twin aims of the TIN are pedagogical and service-oriented. From a
pedagogic standpoint, the TIN gives students the opportunity to conduct
non-scripted factual investigations .... From a service standpoint, the
TIN provides a resource for inmates who did not commit the crime for
which they were sentenced.
http://www.law.uh.edu/faculty/ddow2/dpage2/undercon3.html (last updated Nov.
26, 2002).
13. See Suni, supra note 4, at 924 ("All projects are heavily engaged in the screening
of cases, a time-consuming but necessary task to attempt to separate the most
compelling claims of actual innocence from the many claims that are made. This
screening is an essential function for projects given the limited resources availa-
ble for investigating and litigating actual innocence claims.").
14. This Article will not address some of the matters, including funding, that would
tend to precede the innocence project case selection process. See Stiglitz et al.,
supra note 3, at 421 ("Creating a new program within a law school typically be-
gins with discussions regarding such topics as course content, credit hours, num-
ber of students involved in [the] program, faculty-student ratio, teaching
resources, student selection, grades, and physical plant needs."); see also SHEILA
MARTIN BERRY, So You WANT TO START AN INNOCENCE PROJECT, at http://www.
truthinjustice.org/ipstartup.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
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goals of clinical legal education-specifically, what are the educational
benefits of involving students in case selection? I suggest that, in light
of the vagaries of the experience in litigating innocence cases, active
involvement in the case selection process itself may provide the most
meaningful learning opportunity for students enrolled in an innocence
project.
Since the Second Look Program Clinic at Brooklyn Law School, the
innocence project that William Hellerstein and I formed in March
2001,15 is still in its infancy, I am unable to offer definitive answers to
many of the questions I raise here. Over time, I hope that law school
innocence projects will continue to analyze these considerations and
create procedures that weave as seamless and effective a blend of
them as possible.
II. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A newly formed law school innocence project needs clients and,
therefore, its founders must focus on the creation of case selection cri-
teria and procedures that will yield matters for students. Much has
been written recently about the hallmarks of wrongful convictions-
erroneous eyewitness identifications, police and prosecutorial miscon-
duct, false confessions, ineffective assistance of counsel, racial bias,
dubious forensic testing methodologies ("junk science"), and occasion-
ally fraudulent conduct by forensic scientists themselves. 16 In recog-
nition of the wide-ranging causes of wrongful convictions and their
drastic consequences, innocence projects are justifiably wary of impos-
ing too many prerequisites for the cases they handle. Even so, pre-
scribing some restrictions can help a project expedite its case selection
process and convey its specific mission to the public. Due to meager
resources, innocence projects must find the most promising cases in an
efficient manner and not waste inordinate time investigating baseless
claims.17 Accordingly, it is essential to craft a project's parameters at
15. William E. Hellerstein serves as the Director of our Program. He is a Professor of
Law at Brooklyn Law School and a seasoned criminal defense lawyer, having
spent sixteen years as the Attorney-in-Charge of the Criminal Appeals Bureau of
the Legal Aid Society of New York City. I am the Assistant Director of the clinic
and worked at the Criminal Appeals Bureau as Associate Appellate Counsel prior
to joining the Brooklyn Law School faculty. For a discussion of the issues related
to staffing a new clinic, see Philip G. Schrag, Constructing a Clinic, 3 CLINICAL L.
REV. 175, 186-90 (1996).
16. See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 6.
17. Ellen Suni has noted that the scarcity of resources "impacts innocence projects on
a daily basis." Suni, supra note 4, at 924 n.15; see also Paul R. Tremblay, Toward
a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1101,
1103 (1990) (stating that legal services organizations generally operate based on
a model of "scarcity" under which they must devote significant attention to
screening cases so as to ration their legal services).
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the outset to ensure that the steady stream of cases the clinic so des-
perately seeks does not evolve into a flood and that adequate sifting
mechanisms are in place to uncover the claims with the most merit.
A. Defining Your Scope: Determining What Kinds of Cases
You Want
When William Hellerstein and I formed the Second Look Program
as an in-house clinic,1S we envisioned that the viability of the project
hinged upon-more than anything else-identifying worthwhile cases
for our students. To that end, we devoted the summer of 2001 to find-
ing cases in preparation for our first class in the fall. Before embark-
ing on this venture, however, we needed a roadmap for selecting
cases. 19
Early on, we decided to handle only claims of actual innocence by
inmates whose convictions occurred in New York State, whose appel-
late remedies had been exhausted, and whose claims would not in-
volve DNA testing. These criteria emerged primarily for practical
reasons. First, both of us had experience practicing New York crimi-
nal law and limited exposure to criminal practice in other jurisdic-
tions.20 Second, by restricting our services to claims of actual
18. Our clinic has three main components: a biweekly seminar that examines the
substantive and procedural law involved in the investigation and litigation of in-
nocence cases in New York State, work by student teams on cases we have ac-
cepted for representation, and the screening of prisoner inquiries by individual
students. Loath to ask students to commit to a full year in an untried clinic dur-
ing the 2001-2002 academic year, we structured it as a one semester course for
three credits (one academic and two clinical) with the choice to enroll for a second
semester, an option that all eight of our students exercised. In addition to the
biweekly seminar, we divided our students into four teams of two, and assigned a
preselected case to each team and a handful of inmate inquiries to each student
for evaluation. We formally met with each team once a week to discuss the pro-
gress of their cases and had many impromptu sessions with individual students.
Since this Article concerns the case selection process, I will not delve into the
other aspects of our course in depth, except to note that the three components are
symbiotic and have a dynamic inter-relationship. Interesting issues that arise
during the case selection process have altered the course of our seminar discus-
sions and prompted us to change our assigned readings. For a brief description of
the Second Look Program Clinic, see http://www.brooklaw.edu/courses/index/
courses/?course=116 (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
19. Schrag notes that the intake criteria for new clinics usually flow from decisions
supervisors have already made about the types of cases the clinic will handle.
See Schrag, supra note 15, at 231. Having leeway in the case selection process is
a luxury that clinicians, unlike most practitioners, enjoy. See, e.g., Stacy Caplow,
A Year in Practice: The Journal of a Reflective Clinician, 3 CLINIcAL L. REV. 1, 19
(1996) ("[C]linics are a safe harbor for clinicians .... We rarely have to take a
case; we enjoy considerable, if not total, autonomy over case selection for our pro-
grams, and we choose the areas in which we specialize and even the individual
clients.").
20. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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innocence rather than the broader universe of wrongful convictions,
we aimed to deploy our resources to what we perceived to be the most
deserving cases and, not incidentally, make ourselves more attractive
in grant proposals to prospective benefactors. 21 Third, we concluded
that undertaking direct appeals for inmates who were already entitled
to representation at that stage would be both a misallocation of our
resources and a departure from our self-proclaimed mandate of taking
a "second look" at cases that had not been overturned via regular ap-
pellate channels. Fourth, neither of us had any expertise in DNA is-
sues-plus we had Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld as our neighbors
and specialists on post-conviction DNA testing across the East
River. 2 2 We, like all innocence projects, have tried to cope with the
practical issues of intake standards and procedures, and arrive at a
system consistent with our objectives and funds. 23
1. Substance: Limitations on Case Content
As a threshold matter, a law school innocence project ought to
choose whether it wants to handle wrongful convictions generally or
confine itself to claims of actual innocence. 24 The distinction may be
seen in the following example: a man confesses to murdering his child
and counsel is assigned to represent him. The attorney neglects to file
a motion to suppress the confession even though his client has told
him that the confession was the product of a custodial interrogation
and he was never apprised of his Miranda rights; moreover, no Mi-
randa waiver form surfaces during discovery. With the confession
comprising the sole direct evidence against him, the client is convicted
21. For obvious reasons, working on behalf of innocent prisoners may be a good "sell"
to philanthropic organizations, especially those that are not principally devoted
to funding criminal justice projects. See, e.g., Suni, supra note 4, at 929 n.38.
22. The Innocence Project at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, directed by Barry
Scheck and Peter Neufeld, was founded in 1992 and litigates cases where post-
conviction DNA testing of evidence can produce conclusive proof of innocence.
http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
23. The Director of Clinical Education at Brooklyn Law School, Stacy Caplow, and
the Dean, Joan Wexler, were both extremely supportive of the Second Look Pro-
gram Clinic. This backing allowed us to begin designing the clinic even before we
had received any outside funding. Fortunately, prior to the fall of 2001, we were
awarded several grants to offset expenses.
24. In short, wrongful convictions encompass a range of legal errors and violations of
rights; actual innocence, however, typically "means real, factual innocence: the
inmate did not commit the crime of conviction or some related crime." http:ll
www.hamline.edu/innocence/faq.htm (last modified Jan. 8, 2002); see also Daniel
Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Ac-
quit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1346 n.92 (1997) ("Actual innocence
means what it says-the defendant did not commit the crime of which he has
been convicted. Wrongfully convicted defendants may or may not be actually in-
nocent; their defining characteristic is that their convictions were secured as a
result of a material legal error.").
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of murder and the conviction is affirmed in the state appellate courts,
in no small part because any purported error surrounding the interro-
gation was not preserved for review. That case might be a wrongful
conviction that a clinic could try to overturn, but, without a claim by
the defendant or any evidence to the effect that he did not commit the
crime, it is not a case of actual innocence.
Take the same hypothetical and add the twist that the client has
confessed yet asserts that it was a false confession induced after hours
of police interrogation and the promise that he would not be charged if
he complied with the detective's demands for a statement.2 5 The cli-
ent steadfastly maintains his innocence and tells his lawyer about an
alibi, that he was bowling with friends on the night of the murder.
Notwithstanding this information, his attorney neither files a sup-
pression motion nor mounts an alibi defense, much less initiates any
sort of investigation. The client is subsequently convicted and this de-
cision is affirmed on appeal in the state courts. The rumor in the com-
munity is that the client's wife actually committed the crime and,
years after the appeals have run their course, she indicates she may
be willing to come forward and acknowledge her culpability. That
might be a case of actual innocence for a clinic to litigate, depending
on the specific post-conviction remedies available in the jurisdiction,
by asking the wife to execute an affidavit and testify at a state court
hearing to set aside the conviction based on newly discovered
evidence. 26
On the one hand, the bulk of law school innocence projects exclu-
sively represent inmates with claims of actual innocence.27 In a world
of scarce resources, concentrating on the most worthy cases makes a
lot of sense, presupposing one views the presence of a factually inno-
cent person ("he didn't do it") languishing in jail to be a greater injus-
tice than that of a wrongfully convicted prisoner ("even if he did it, he
shouldn't have been convicted"). 28 Also, working on actual innocence
claims may prove helpful in raising funds from the outside world and
25. For an interesting essay on false confessions and their role in the conviction of
innocent persons, see Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences,
and Solutions, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 36
(Saundra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001).
26. This might be grounds for a hearing in New York, for instance, although the de-
fense would have to prove that this evidence could not have been found with due
diligence at the time of trial. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(g) (McKinney
1994).
27. See, e.g., Wisconsin Report, supra note 3.
28. See, e.g., http://www.ncip.scu.edu/cases we take.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2003)
("[R]esources ... are extremely limited. Therefore, the Northern California Inno-
cence Project (NCIP) only considers cases of California prisoners who were con-
victed in Northern California courts and are seeking to advance a claim of factual
innocence.").
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in selling the project internally to the school administration and
faculty. 29
On the other hand, several projects are open to all claims of wrong-
ful conviction. 3 0 To some degree, this approach may offset a criticism
that criminal defense lawyers often level at innocence projects: that a
focus on innocence presents a warped picture of the criminal justice
system to students and the public at large and, even worse, may pro-
vide a disservice to most criminal defendants. 3 1 That is, for many
criminal defendants, who likely are factually guilty yet may have been
wrongfully convicted, the increased emphasis on innocence has argua-
bly obscured the importance of their own otherwise valid claims. Even
if projects restricted to actual innocence claims cast a fun-house mir-
ror image of the criminal justice system-accentuating aspects that
may be disproportionately small in comparison to more pervasive sys-
temic warts-they clearly fill a void considering the absence of as-
signed counsel on most post-conviction matters and the investigative
expense of pursuing claims based largely on factual error. Also, these
projects ideally have a profound deterrent effect in that heightened
awareness that some inmates are innocent may, in turn, lead to
heightened protection of all defendants' rights at trial.
Another factor in shaping the contours of a project's intake criteria
pertains to innocence claims that would involve the DNA testing of
biological evidence. Although most law school innocence projects ac-
cept both DNA and non-DNA cases, some projects limit themselves to
handling DNA claims.3 2 As noted above, our Second Look Program
29. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
30. For example, the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University
School of Law, one of the most prominent and successful projects, evidently han-
dles both actual innocence and wrongful conviction claims, although at present it
appears to restrict its intake to actual innocence cases. See Wisconsin Report,
supra note 3, at 4; http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongfullnew-
cases.htm (last revised Jan. 13, 2002); see also Suni, supra note 4, at 926 ("Some
projects are set up so as to handle only claims of absolute innocence . . . other
projects will handle all claims on behalf of an individual making a claim of inno-
cence and will continue representation even if it is determined that the defendant
is not factually innocent.").
31. Some criminal defense lawyers seem convinced that a focus on innocence is mis-
guided. In their view, although releasing innocent people from prison is a good
thing, those cases constitute a non-representative sampling of criminal defend-
ants and the popular fascination with innocence deflects attention from more ba-
nal miscarriages of justice.
32. The Cooley Innocence Project and the Innocence Project at Cardozo restrict their
intake to DNA cases. See Stiglitz et al., supra note 3, at 425 n.45. Several other
projects that utilize law students-including the Florida Innocence Project and
the New England Innocence Project-have also indicated that they exclusively
handle DNA claims. See Wisconsin Report, supra note 3; http://www.appellate
solutions.com/Co-director.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2003); http://www.criminal
justice. org/public. nsf/Defense Updates/New England Innocence? Open Document
(last visited Jan. 10, 2003). The majority of law school innocence projects, how-
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Clinic is solely devoted to non-DNA cases. Jan Stiglitz and his col-
leagues at the California Innocence Project at California Western
School of Law have analyzed many of the arguments surrounding the
"To DNA or Not To DNA" debate.33 Not only have most of the exoner-
ations in the last decade resulted from DNA testing,34 signifying that
a project's efforts may more likely bear fruit by handling those cases,
but making the availability of a DNA claim mandatory also simplifies
the screening process. 35 Nevertheless, DNA testing is only an option
in a smattering of cases, and it can be costly-an important variable
for most start-up projects. 36
In contrast, handling non-DNA claims allows a project to explore a
greater variety of inquiries and lacks the fixed cost of scientific test-
ing, even though the work may be laborious at the case selection as
well as the investigation and litigation stages. Non-DNA cases can
linger for years, testing the patience and resolve of clinic students and
faculty, and accrue significant investigation expenditures. 3 7 Also, for
projects restricted to actual innocence claims as opposed to wrongful
convictions generally, there might be the innate problem of determin-
ing whether the prisoner is, in fact, innocent.38 One benefit of the
ever, appear to accept cases with either DNA and/or non-DNA components. See
Wisconsin Report, supra note 3.
33. See Stiglitz et al., supra note 3, at 423-25.
34. On its website, the Innocence Project at Cardozo offers an up-to-date calculation
of the number of DNA exonerations across the United States. http://www.
innocenceproject.org (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
35. See Stiglitz et al., supra note 3, at 423-25.
36. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Aliza B. Kaplan, The Necessity
of Funding for Post-Conviction DNA Testing: The Amended Rule 30(c)(5) of the
Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, 4 SECTION REV. (Mass. B. Ass'n, Bos-
ton, Mass.), Winter 2002, at 75-76 (noting that as of early 2002, only eleven of the
twenty-four states with post-conviction DNA statutes allocated funds for the
tests). Innocence projects do not necessarily have to shoulder the financial bur-
den for these tests. For example, the Innocence Project at Cardozo explains on its
website that "[wihile defendants are not charged for our legal services, they and
their advocates are responsible for funding the costs of DNA testing. We simply
do not have the resources to provide pro bono DNA testing." http://www.inno-
cenceproject.org/about/faq.php (last visited Jan. 10, 2003). The emergence of
DNA testing has provoked some legislators to support bills, such as the Califor-
nia Innocence Protection Program, that earmark funds for organizations to con-
duct these tests as part of investigating innocence claims. See, e.g., NCIP
Receives State Funding, INNOCENCE Q. (N. Cal. Innocence Project/Santa Clara
Univ., Santa Clara, Cal.), Spring 2002, at 3.
37. The cost of investigating an innocence claim is contingent upon numerous ele-
ments, including the specific facts involved and the ability of clinic students to
perform many of the investigative tasks. In our experience with non-DNA
claims, it may be necessary to hire private investigators to conduct polygraph
tests and interview certain witnesses.
38. See, e.g., Barry Scheck & Peter Neufeld, DNA and Innocence Scholarship, in
WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 241, supra note 25, at
248-49.
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advent of DNA testing is that, where it applies, it can provide a modi-
cum of certainty to support a person's claim,3 9 e.g., where the semen
from a rape committed by one perpetrator is tested and the results
show that another person committed the crime. One downside, per-
haps more theoretical than actual, is that this development has raised
the bar for proving innocence in non-DNA cases; where there is no
scientific proof of innocence, prosecutors and judges could conceivably
be even more skeptical of claims than they were in the past. Alterna-
tively, exonerations based on DNA testing could (and should) be con-
strued as the tip of the iceberg, a warning that a similar error rate
presumably applies in cases without biological evidence and that
members of the criminal justice system should be receptive to legiti-
mate non-DNA claims of innocence as well.40
One additional substantive limitation to consider, especially with
regard to non-DNA innocence cases, is whether to require that the in-
mate have an alibi or otherwise possess evidence showing he in no
way participated in the conduct at issue in the crime. In claims where
there is no biological evidence and the newly discovered evidence al-
leged by the defense consists chiefly, if not entirely, of witness state-
ments, presence at the scene can be a difficult hurdle to overcome.
Indeed, the Wisconsin Innocence Project at the University of Wiscon-
sin Law School declares that:
Because of the difficulty of proving innocence in certain types of cases, the
program usually cannot help in the following situations: (1) where a defendant
admits to killing (or assaulting) someone, but claims that it was done in self-
defense; (2) where a defendant admits to sexual contact with a person, but
claims that the person consented to the contact; (3) where a defendant was
convicted as an accessory (or as a party-to-the-crime) and seeks to show that
he or she did not play a major role in the crime. 4 1
Similarly, the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law "is restricted to handling only cases of persons
who assert that they were in no way involved in the crimes for which
they were convicted." 4 2 The Second Look Program Clinic has not
ruled out the possibility of accepting a case involving self-defense, con-
39. See id.
40. See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 6; see also James S. Liebman, Comment, The New
Death Penalty Debate: What's DNA Got To Do With It?, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L.
REV. 527, 546-47 (2002) (stating that in DNA cases, "[i]f it were not for the sheer
accident that a biological sample happened to be available, the miscarriage never
would have been discovered.... Suddenly and starkly, DNA reveals us and our
institutions to be what they strive to escape notice for being: inherently but often
unknowably-and thus incurably-flawed, unreliable, and untrustoworthy.").
41. http://www.law.wisc.edu/FJR/innocence (last visited Jan. 10, 2003); see also http:/
/www.hamline.edu/innocence/faq.htm (last modified Jan. 8, 2002) (noting that
the Innocence Project of Minnesota has similar requirements).
42. http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongfulnewcases.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 10, 2003).
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sensual sex, or culpability as an accessory, though, in actuality, it is
unlikely we would undertake one. 4 3
2. Form: Procedural, Jurisdictional, and Other Limitations
Along with guidelines relating to the substance of the cases that an
innocence project may accept for representation, each project should
consider whether to formulate additional intake criteria. Although
several clinics have a national reach, such as the Innocence Project at
Cardozo, most only evaluate cases deriving from a particular state or
region.4 4 Some projects are extremely strict in this regard: the Inno-
cence Project New Orleans originally required that a prospective cli-
ent's conviction occurred in Orleans or Jefferson Parishes in
Louisiana.45 Crucial factors in determining a program's geographic
scope could include where faculty members involved with the clinic
are licensed to practice law (or have extensive contacts) and the prox-
imity of comparable innocence projects in the area. For instance, the
Innocence Project of Minnesota accepts cases from its home state as
well as North Dakota and South Dakota, which do not have their own
projects. 4 6 Likewise, the Center on Wrongful Convictions handles
43. Among the five cases that we have accepted for full representation, there is evi-
dence supporting the inmate's alibi in four of them and evidence in the fifth that
our client, though present at the scene, was several yards away from the stabbing
of an inmate in a prison yard.
44. See Wisconsin Report, supra note 3. Some projects limit their scope not only to a
particular region, but also to state court convictions in that jurisdiction. See
http://www.ncip.scu.edu/cases we take.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2003) (indicat-
ing Northern California Innocence Project requires conviction from California
state court); cf. http://www.law.wisc.edu/FJR/innocence (last visited Dec. 30,
2002) ("The Wisconsin Innocence Project primarily takes cases from individuals
wrongly convicted in state and federal courts in Wisconsin.").
45. See Wisconsin Report, supra note 3; http://lapda.org/innpro.htm (last visited Dec.
30, 2002). The Innocence Project New Orleans has expanded its geographic
range since its founding and now seeks to serve prisoners across Louisiana.
http://www.ip-no.org/process.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2003).
46. http://www.hamline.edu/innocence (last modified Jan. 8, 2002). The Innocence
Project of Minnesota, headquartered at Hamline University School of Law, may
accept cases from outside these states only "[i]n extraordinary circumstances, for
example, where there is no innocence project serving the inmate's area." Id.
Similarly, on rare occasions, the Wisconsin Innocence Project will consider cases
from several neighbors in the Upper Midwest-Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan,
and Minnesota-but advises that inmates from outside Wisconsin "should at-
tempt to find an Innocence Project that is nearer to their location." http:/!
www.law.wisc.edu/FJR/innocence (last visited Dec. 30, 2002). The Innocence
Project Northwest, located at the University of Washington School of Law, covers
cases arising from Alaska, Idaho, Montana, and Oregon, in addition to Washing-
ton. http://www.law.washington.edu/ipnw/cases.shtml (last visited Dec. 30,
2002).
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cases from Illinois, its home base, and from states that lack innocence
projects. 4 7
To merit consideration, innocence projects also frequently require
cases to be in a precise procedural posture and clients themselves to
be in a specific income bracket. First, the exhaustion of all direct ap-
peals is a common prerequisite.48 Second, many projects demand that
inmate applicants have been convicted of a serious felony and/or have
a significant prison term left to serve,49 a reflection of the lengthy
time frame often needed in litigating these cases and the desire to aid
only people in the most dire straits. For the North Carolina Center on
Actual Innocence, at least three years must be left on the inmate's
sentence,DO whereas the Wisconsin Innocence Project generally ref-
uses to accept cases with less than seven years of imprisonment re-
maining.51 The Center on Wrongful Convictions dictates that a
minimum of ten years must remain prior to the inmate's parole date
(for non-DNA claims),52 and the Thomas M. Cooley Innocence Project
in Michigan simply requires a "substantial sentence."53 Third, a pris-
oner's inability to pay for private counsel or obtain appointed counsel
may also be a requirement, be it explicit or implicit.54 This condition
echoes the oft-stated mission of many innocence projects (and other
47. See Wisconsin Report, supra note 3.
48. See, e.g., http://www.law.wisc.edu/FJR/innocence (last visited Dec. 30, 2002)
("Wisconsin Innocence Project takes cases only after a person has been convicted
and all direct appeals have ended or the time for filing a direct appeal has
passed."); http://lawschool.unm.edu/student.orgs/ijp/about (last visited Dec. 30,
2002) (providing similar requirements for New Mexico Innocence and Justice
Project).
49. Some innocence projects specify that a certain number of years must remain on
the inmate's sentence, whereas others, like the Northern California Innocence
Project, state more broadly that the prisoner must have been convicted of a major
crime. See, e.g., http://www.ncip.scu.edu/cases-wetake.htm (last visited Jan. 10,
2003) ("The inmate must have been convicted in California state court of a seri-
ous felony or a felony involving a three-strikes sentence.").
50. http://www.law.duke.edu/innocencecenter/cases.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2002)
(noting that the project has students from Duke and the University of North Car-
olina Law Schools working under faculty supervision).
51. http://www.law.wisc.edu/FJR/innocence (last visited Dec. 30, 2002).
52. http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongfunewcases.htm (last re-
vised Apr. 29, 2002).
53. http://www.cooleylaw.edu/innocence/home.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2002); see
also http://www.hamline.edu/innocence (last modified Jan. 8, 2002) (stating that
the Innocence Project of Minnesota also requires a "substantial sentence"). To
satisfy its intake criteria, the Innocence Project New Orleans currently prescribes
that an applicant "[m]ust be serving a life sentence at the Louisiana State Peni-
tentiary in Angola." http://www.ip-no.org/process.html (last visited Jan. 22,
2003).
54. The Innocence Project New Orleans explicitly states that the prisoner must be
indigent. http://lapda.org/innpro.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2002); http://ip-no.org/
process.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2003); see also http://www.law.washington.edu/
ipnw (last visited Dec. 30, 2002) (noting that Innocence Project Northwest attor-
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clinics, for that matter)5 5 to provide a service that is otherwise un-
available. Finally, some projects insist that the prisoner must not be
currently represented by an attorney at all. 56
Another variable to consider in the case selection process revolves
around the prisoner's prior criminal record and how his potential re-
lease might fare in the court of public opinion. As a practical matter,
many innocence cases are resolved in the political arena rather than
in a courtroom because lawyers handling these cases may try to
thwart potential problems by arranging to meet with the District At-
torney's Office prior to commencing litigation. 57 The goal for this
meeting might range from asking prosecutors outright to agree to a
vacatur of the conviction, imploring them to join in (or not contest) a
motion for a new hearing, or suggesting they begin their own investi-
gation into the case. Getting the opposition "on board," so to speak,
can make it more difficult for a court to deny a claim on the motion
papers alone, 58 and conceivably can allow the prosecution to make
some political headway by coming across as fair-minded and open to
neys assist inmates who "cannot afford counsel and who no longer have a right to
appointed counsel").
55. See infra section III.A.
56. See, e.g., http://www.law.wisc.edu/FJR/innocence (last visited Dec. 30, 2002)
("The [Wisconsin Innocence] Project also is unable to assist inmates who are cur-
rently represented in their criminal case by another attorney."). This condition
seemingly relates to the indigence requirement because, given the absence of as-
signed counsel for most post-conviction matters, the existence of an attorney at
this stage probably indicates she has been privately retained. Alternatively, even
where a project does not exclude claims by inmates who are already represented
by counsel, providing different screening procedures in those situations can in-
crease efficiency. For instance, the Innocence Project at Cardozo advises that "[i]f
the defendant is represented, you should have the attorney(s) contact us directly.
That way, we can lend assistance to the case without having to go through the
evaluation process." http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/faq.php (last visited
Dec. 30, 2002).
57. We approach the District Attorney's Office before litigating most of our innocence
cases based on the assumption that prosecutors, in general, dislike the notion of a
person serving a prison sentence for a crime that he did not commit and would be
willing to listen. Inviting them to work with us, as opposed to against us, in
theory affords prosecutors a chance to correct an error and avoid tarnishing the
reputation of the office. Although we are aware this strategy may alert the prose-
cution about our claim in advance of litigation, we think the potential advantages
outweigh the drawbacks. So far, we have had mixed results. In one case, the
prosecution readily agreed to meet and undertook its own re-investigation; in an-
other, the Assistant District Attorney assigned to the matter told me he was not
comfortable with these types of "extra-judicial" communications and recom-
mended I go ahead and file a motion.
58. In New York, for example, the state trial courts are deluged with post-conviction
motions and often summarily deny requests to vacate a conviction based on newly
discovered evidence without holding a hearing. Approaching the prosecution to
see if they will consent to a hearing may go a long way toward getting a day in
court.
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the truth.59 All other things being equal, assisting an innocent person
without any prior convictions may be more palatable to the District
Attorney's Office than aiding someone who is innocent of the crime for
which he is incarcerated but has an extensive criminal record. 60 To
that end, the Second Look Program Clinic factors an inmate's record
into deciding whether we can be of assistance, although we refuse to
require that applicants have a minor record, let alone a clean slate.61
59. District attorneys are theoretically accountable to the public by virtue of the sim-
ple fact that, for the most part, they are elected. See, e.g., Robert L. Misner, Re-
casting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 734 (1996)
(stating that over 95% of chief prosecutors are elected at the municipal and
county levels). However, the true extent of prosecutorial accountability is subject
to debate. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence,
Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IowA L. REV. 393, 448 (2001) (noting that
even if "the desire to maintain public accountability ... propelled the current
paradigm of the elected public prosecutor ... proponents of this system did not
adequately consider the private nature of prosecutorial decisions and the lack of
public access to information about how and why prosecutors make decisions"); see
also id. at 443 n.258. For a discussion of prosecutors' duties in the context of
post-conviction innocence claims, see Judith A. Goldberg & David M. Siegel, The
Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors in Cases Involving Postconviction Claims of
Innocence, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 389 (2002).
60. Jacqueline St. Joan and Nancy Ehrenreich have written about the manner in
which practical politics affected their client selection in running the Battered Wo-
men's Clemency Reform Project at the University of Denver College of Law. Jac-
queline St. Joan & Nancy Ehrenreich, Putting Theory into Practice: A Battered
Women's Clemency Clinic, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 171, 208-12 (2001). Seeking clem-
ency from the governor for battered women convicted of crimes meant "dealing
with a political process that is itself likely to be subject to good girl/bad girl think-
ing." Id. at 209. As they surveyed the political landscape, they stated:
Success seemed likely to be tied to whether the women's cases conformed
to prevailing images of who are "real" battered women (virtuous, victim-
ized, married women), of what their relationships are like (punctuated
by daily, one-sided, physical violence), and of how they behave (pas-
sively, timidly, pathologically). Cases where the woman's conduct was
particularly grisly, or where she was depicted in the press as angry and
remorseless, seemed especially unlikely to succeed.
Id. at 210-11. Describing their client selection decisions as "heart-wrenchingly
difficult," St. Joan and Ehrenreich offered no "easy answers to the questions they
raised." Id. at 211. Although a clemency clinic necessarily engages the political
process more directly than do most innocence projects, these experiences are
quite telling about the manner in which pragmatic assessments of the chance for
success-that may have little or nothing to do with the factual and legal merits of
an inmate's case-can influence case selection choices. Moreover, innocence
projects may occasionally file clemency petitions on behalf of inmates. See, e.g.,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions.documents/Heirens.htm
(last visited Dec. 30, 2002) (discussing the Center on Wrongful Convictions' effort
to obtain clemency for William Heirens, who has served over fifty years in
prison).
61. To an extent, and for similar reasons, we also consider a prisoner's disciplinary
history during his incarceration.
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Like many other innocence projects, we impose substantive, proce-
dural, and jurisdictional conditions in our Second Look Program
Clinic. We formally require a claim of actual innocence that is not
based on DNA testing and the exhaustion of direct appeals in a convic-
tion that occurred within New York State before consideration by our
project, and informally bear in mind the duration of the inmate's re-
maining sentence, the prior criminal record, and whether another at-
torney has been retained. These requirements, however, are subject
to exceptions; for instance, we accepted one especially promising case
despite the fact that the direct appeal had not yet been filed and the
inmate had a public defender assigned to perfect that appeal, and we
have entered two other matters as co-counsel. Moreover, in another
case, we helped to secure our client's release on parole and are still
contemplating whether and how to continue to assist him in his effort
to overturn his conviction. 6 2 In essence, we found the facts of these
cases to be particularly compelling and, as a result, found ourselves
unwilling to decline the requests for assistance.
Overall, we have tried to ensure that the lines drawn around our
project's case selection methodology are clearly marked but occasion-
ally permeable.6 3 Too rigid a line between inmate requests that qual-
ify for consideration and those that are immediately ousted would fail
to account for the subjectivity inherent in the case selection process
and the fact that innocence cases are often messy and ill-suited to cat-
egorization. When it comes down to it, intake criteria are useful
guides but should not be taken as gospel; any project would be hard-
pressed to abandon a convincing case of innocence. Ultimately, the
deft screener must be mindful that valid claims may fall outside the
scope of the project and that accommodations should sometimes be
made or, at the very least, the case should be forwarded to another
organization.
62. In certain situations, innocence projects might consider becoming involved in the
parole process. In the fall of 2001, we handled a case where we were convinced
our client had not committed the 1984 murder for which he was convicted. Un-
fortunately, there had already been a hearing at which much of the post-convic-
tion evidence had been heard, and rejected, and we were having difficulty
locating any new evidence that could serve as the springboard for a new hearing.
So we intervened in the parole process, filing a document with the Parole Board
asking it not to hold our client's refusal to acknowledge his guilt against him
(which the Board typically does) given our belief that he was innocent of the
charge. The Board released our client on parole in the spring of 2002. For infor-
mation concerning the New York State Division of Parole and the procedures fol-
lowed by its Board of Parole, see http://parole.state.ny.us/ (last visited Dec. 30,
2002).
63. Although the exceptions seem to have swallowed the rules so far in selecting
cases for the Second Look Program Clinic, our intake criteria play a vital role in
evaluating inmate inquiries daily and helping us to isolate the strongest claims.
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B. Putting Theory into Practice: How Do You Get the Cases
You Want?
The way in which a particular law school innocence project defines
its intake criteria often reflects a balance between its objectives and
its resources. As discussed above, most projects aim to help the needi-
est candidates, namely, factually innocent prisoners with long
sentences and no other recourse for assistance. It is one thing,
though, to devise the theoretical parameters for an innocence project;
it is quite another to put theory into practice and actually ferret out
cases that come within those parameters.
1. Inflow: Gathering Prospective Innocence Claims
Law school clinics traditionally obtain clients through a variety of
means, including court assignments, referrals from community orga-
nizations and legal service providers, and inquiries generated through
the use of the media.6 4 In accumulating potential clients so far, the
Second Look Program Clinic has relied primarily on a combination of
referrals from local attorneys and unsolicited inquiries from inmates
who have heard of us through either the prison grapevine and/or pub-
licity about our project in the media.
In particular, an article in the New York Law Journal in January
2001 about William Hellerstein's successful effort to reverse the
wrongful robbery conviction of a former Golden Gloves boxer and his
intention to form a clinic to take a "second look" at cases spurred a
torrent of letters from inmates across the state before we had even
64. Use of the media could even, depending on local bar rules, include advertising.
See Schrag, supra note 15, at 229. Obviously, one structural benefit of affiliating
in some fashion with a public defender organization is the existence of a ready-
made base of potential clients. See Donald M. Duquette, Developing a Child Ad-
vocacy Law Clinic: A Law School Clinical Legal Educational Opportunity, 31 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 10 (1997) ("[Bly associating with a group like a prosecutor's
office, child advocacy group, or a public defender's office, a clinic can select the
most interesting cases at their educationally most valuable stage and then return
them to the office when they no longer suit educational purposes."). Many clinics
procure clients through multiple sources as opposed to relying on any single
source in particular. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson & Amagda Perez, Clinical Legal
Education and the U.C. Davis Immigration Law Clinic: Putting Theory into Prac-
tice and Practice into Theory, 51 SMU L. REV. 1423, 1436 (1998) (noting that the
Immigration Law Clinic at the U.C. Davis School of Law takes referrals from the
immigration court in San Francisco, attorneys, legal services organizations, and
the immigrant community itself); Maureen E. Laflin, Toward the Making of Good
Lawyers: How an Appellate Clinic Satisfies the Professional Objectives of the Mac-
Crate Report, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 9-11 (1997-1998) (explaining that the Appellate
Clinic at the University of Idaho College of Law receives cases from the Ninth
Circuit, public defender organizations, referrals from other organizations, law-
yers, and individuals, or by commencing an appeal from the general clinic's crimi-
nal and civil cases).
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launched a formal project.6 5 Within a few months we had received
over 150 requests for assistance, an initial perusal of which quickly
revealed that many did not even concern innocence; rather, they were
pleas for research help, information about filing civil suits against
prison officials, and other unrelated questions. While we acknowl-
edged there could be some gems within this batch of correspondence,
we also knew it might take a tremendous amount of time to spot them.
And time was of the essence. Given our desire to locate cases in ad-
vance of our inaugural class of students in the fall of 2001, we soon
decided that polling our contacts in the New York legal community
and finding referrals through them might be a wise path to take.66
Although our approach could be criticized as "creaming"-skimming
the best cases off the top of overloaded attorneys' desks at other of-
fices-this practice can be justified by the fact that we aim to provide
high-quality legal and investigative services in a timely manner and
fill a niche in the region. 67
One advantage of seeking cases through "creaming" is that there is
a built-in vouching function. A lawyer, presumably a respected and
experienced one, has already reviewed the claim and determined it
may be worth pursuing.68 One potential disadvantage, however,
could arise if and when a project disagrees with the referring lawyer's
judgment and decides to reject the matter, a decision that could cause
interpersonal strain. Also, the degree to which the referring organiza-
tion or attorney wants to participate in the handling of the case could
create problems, such as in a co-counsel arrangement where there is a
dispute as to how to proceed and the division of authority is not ade-
quately defined.69
Together with establishing a referral network,70 reaching out to
journalists with ideas about stories, granting interview requests, at-
65. Victoria Rivkin, Unjust Conviction Inspires "Second Look," N.Y. L.J., Jan. 10,
2001, at 1.
66. Referrals might be a desirable method of obtaining cases for any new clinic, espe-
cially clinics that have a specialized subject matter or other limitations. See
Schrag, supra note 15, at 229.
67. Duquette, supra note 64, at 10 (discussing "creaming").
68. Schrag observes that referring lawyers or organizations may even have provided
some pre-screening services by interviewing the client beforehand. Schrag, supra
note 15, at 229.
69. In the cases that we have entered as co-counsel, we have tried to make our role
clear. In one case, our role is mainly secondary-to provide support for another
attorney on a federal habeas corpus petition that the attorney filed. In another
case, we have taken more of a primary role in devising strategy and drafting
motions, much to the relief of our overburdened co-counsel.
70. The Innocence Project at Cardozo has been instrumental in creating a national
Innocence Network, a consortium of projects that can serve as a resource for re-
ferrals and tactical information. See http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/
other_projects.php (last visited Dec. 30, 2002). Listing a project on one or more of
the other innocence project directories available on the internet can be a helpful
111520031
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
tending conferences, creating a website, and brainstorming with mem-
bers of the school's public relations staff may all be feasible methods to
enhance a project's profile with an eye toward generating inquiries
from prospective clients. Naturally, these approaches may have the
same deleterious side effects as unsolicited inquiries have generally-
being inundated with requests, many of which have nothing to do with
innocence-coupled with the ever-present risk of bad publicity. Accu-
rately predicting how a reporter will portray the clinic may prove elu-
sive, and the possibility that negative facts about a client or a
prospective client could surface in the media should not be ignored.
2. Outflow: Procedures for Evaluating Potential Cases
In due course, receiving a sufficient number of requests from in-
mates seeking assistance turns out to be the least of an innocence pro-
ject's problems. Well-known organizations like the Innocence Project
at Cardozo amass thousands of new requests each year and even
smaller, recently formed clinics like ours can be smothered with corre-
spondence.71 The challenge then becomes how to implement a system
to unearth the best claims from within this epistolary mountain.
We have developed a process designed to winnow out the cases that
meet our intake criteria and appear to have the greatest likelihood for
a positive resolution. As is evidently the situation with all of the cur-
rent law school innocence projects, we embrace an "open intake" sys-
tem:72 instead of accepting a discrete number of cases and seeing
them to fruition before taking on others, the Second Look Program
Clinic constantly evaluates new claims regardless of how many clients
we have agreed to represent. This practice improves the odds of find-
ing viable claims of actual innocence within our mandate, which may
be few and far between.73
I like to think of our case selection method as a funnel with several
stages, after any of which a case may be rejected yet only after the
successful completion of all may a case be accepted. Upon initially
referral device as well. See, e.g., http://www.ga-innocenceproject.org/nationwide-
innocence-projects.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2002); http://www.law.wisc.edu/FJR/
innocence/otherjips.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2002); http://www.ncip.scu.edu/in-
nocence.projects.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2002); http://www.truthinjustice.org/
ipcontacts.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2002).
71. During our first year of operation, we received requests for assistance concerning
roughly 450 different inmates. See also California Innocence Project Reviews
More Than 1,400 Cases in First Year of Operation, ICDA NEWS (Inst. for Criminal
Defense Advocacy, California Western School of Law, San Diego, Cal.), Fall 2001,
at 1. Sometimes family members or friends of an inmate will initiate contact
through a telephone call. In those circumstances, I typically recommend that
they ask the prisoner to write to me so that I can open a file on the matter and
establish a direct channel of communication with the prospective client.
72. See Stiglitz et al., supra note 3, at 425.
73. Id.
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receiving a request for assistance, William Hellerstein or I will make a
determination as to whether to reject it outright or to pursue the mat-
ter further. If it is evident that we cannot be of assistance to the in-
mate, we will send what we refer to as an "A" letter.7 4 Examples of
situations where an "A" letter may be appropriate include where the
inmate is not making a claim of innocence involving his current con-
viction in New York or the substance of the letter indicates such a
claim undeniably lacks merit.75 If the letter mentions or even merely
alludes to a palpable claim of innocence in a current New York case,
we send a "B" letter, 76 along with a copy of our screening question-
naire and a form authorizing us to begin a preliminary investigation.
On the whole, we are rather lenient in slotting requests into the "B"
letter category. 7 7
After receiving the questionnaire, we assign a student to review
the file thoroughly and then write an "Evaluation Memorandum" of-
fering an assessment of the case. The format for the Evaluation Mem-
orandum is straightforward: a one to two page description of (a) the
materials received from the inmate, (b) the procedural history of the
case, (c) the prisoner's criminal record, (d) the facts of the incident
relating to the conviction, (e) contact information for the inmate's fam-
ily members and prior attorneys, and (f) a preliminary prognosis as-
sessing the viability of the innocence claim and proposing a course of
action. I try to meet with students routinely to discuss their recom-
mendations and analyze how they reached those conclusions. In addi-
tion to these conferences, I periodically update a master "Screening
Summary" by taking excerpts from the Evaluation Memoranda and
allocating each inmate's request to a specific category: Worth Pursuing
74. Here is the "A" letter language that we use (subject to revision if further explana-
tion is needed, as is often the case): "This will acknowledge receipt of your letter
to the Second Look Program Clinic at Brooklyn Law School requesting assis-
tance. However, due to the nature of your request, we are not in a position to
provide you with the type of assistance that you are seeking."
75. In accordance with our intake criteria, we also generally turn down requests at
this point when the inmate is currently represented by an attorney and/or seeks
help in a pending matter (i.e., with a direct appeal). See supra notes 48-56 and
accompanying text. We frequently refer inmates to other innocence projects
when they were convicted out-of-state or their claim hinges on DNA testing.
76. The "B" letter language is as follows:
The Second Look Program Clinic at Brooklyn Law School has received
your recent letter in which you requested assistance with your current
conviction. In order to help us to make a preliminary evaluation as to
whether we can be of assistance, please answer the enclosed question-
naire as fully as possible and return it to us along with a signed copy of
the authorization form (located on the last page of the questionnaire). If
you need additional space to answer a particular question, please do so
on a sheet of paper indicating by number which question you are
answering.
77. Of the first 431 requests we collected, 190 received "A" letters and 241 received
"B" letters.
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I (with enthusiasm); Worth Pursuing II (further investigation needed);
Possible (further evaluation required); and Not Worth Pursuing!
Rejected.78
My estimate is that we reject roughly half of our cases shortly after
consulting with students about their Evaluation Memoranda.79 Re-
garding the other cases, we have generally opted to ask for further
documentation, such as transcripts and police reports, and/or to initi-
ate a dialogue with one of the inmate's contacts, typically the trial or
appellate attorney. If we choose to follow through with the matter af-
ter completing one or both of these steps, we assign the student who
drafted the Evaluation Memorandum to continue the investigation
under our supervision.
a. Stage One: The Pre-Screening Assessment
We have debated whether to omit our initial "A"-"B" letter assess-
ment and send questionnaires in response to every single inquiry.
Some innocence projects make their questionnaires available on their
websites, intimating that they are not opposed to receiving a com-
pleted questionnaire as part of an inmate's opening salvo.8 0 Our lin-
78. I also keep a master list of inmates accorded "A" and "B" status, updating it regu-
larly to reflect notable changes, for example, when a "B" candidate is rejected at a
later point in the evaluation phase. I will not say much about case-tracking de-
vices, except to note the obvious-this consideration is important as the number
of inquiries soars. The better the system, the easier it will be to respond to status
requests and check for conflicts of interest. Several innocence projects use Ami-
cus Attorney, a popular law office practice management program that permits
students and faculty to edit, evaluate, and organize case data from their
desktops. See Mary Likins, NCIP Goes High-Tech with Amicus Attorney, INNO-
CENCE Q. (N. Cal. Innocence Project/Santa Clara Univ., Santa Clara, Cal.), Spring
2002, at 6.
79. Precise statistics are difficult to compute because in our formative months, when
we had relatively few inquiries, we proceeded with some type of preliminary in-
vestigation for almost every case. Over time, for better or for worse, we became
more decisive in rejecting claims based on the questionnaire and other supple-
mental papers.
80. For example, questionnaires are available on the websites of the California Inno-
cence Project, the Center on Wrongful Convictions, the Innocence Project of Min-
nesota, the Innocence Project Northwest, the North Carolina Center on Actual
Innocence, the Northern California Innocence Project, and the Wisconsin Inno-
cence Project. http://www.cwsl.edu/icdali-Innocence.html (last visited Dec. 30,
2002) (intake questionnaire); http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/
wrongfullnewcases.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2002) (questionnaire); http://www.
hamline.edu/innocence/InmateApplication.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2002)
(screening questionnaire); http://www.law.washington.edu/ipnw/questionnaire.
htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2002) (screening questionnaire); http://www.law.duke.
edu/innocencecenter/cases.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2002) (screening question-
naire); http://www.ncip.scu.edu/caseswetake.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2003)
(initial screening questionnaire); http://law.wisc.edu/FJR/innocence/requesting-
assis.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2002) (application for assistance form). The Texas
Innocence Network at the University of Houston Law Center makes its question-
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gering preference, after some reflection, is to keep our pre-screening
system as a means of curtailing the overall amount of questionnaires
to review. First, dispatching with the obvious rejections up-front
streamlines the entire case selection process. Second, since we are
wary of jettisoning potentially meritorious cases too readily, we err on
the side of caution and send a questionnaire when there is any doubt
whatsoever whether a query falls on the "A" or "B" side of the ledger.
Finally, it is our view-and this may be mere rationalization on our
part-that actually innocent prisoners generally will not be deterred
by an initial rejection letter and will continue to write.8 1
b. Stage Two: The Questionnaire
An inmate questionnaire form, a crucial step in the case selection
process, is used by virtually all innocence projects to discern whether
a claim fulfills their intake guidelines. Because meeting each appli-
cant in person is not pragmatic, for a whole host of reasons, including
logistical problems with arranging and conducting prison visits,82 the
questionnaire might be viewed as a proxy for a preliminary screening
interview. The nature of the specific questions on the form, not to
mention its length,8 3 varies from project to project, reflecting differ-
ences in selection criteria, but the objective remains the same: to
gather information and separate the strongest claims from the
weakest.
Keeping in mind the wide discrepancies in questionnaire format
and, to a lesser degree, content, I will note some of the traits that
unite them, mainly a combination of technical or procedural questions
naire available only after receiving a request to consider a claim and determining
that it satisfies the program's requirements. http://www.law.uh.edu/faculty/
ddow2/dpage2/underconl.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2002).
81. This resubmission occurs fairly frequently, especially when we modify our "A"
letters to contain an explanation for our decision, e.g., "we only investigate claims
of factual innocence and it appears as though you are alleging legal errors," and
the inmate writes back, describing how his case supposedly satisfies our criteria.
In those situations, we often respond by sending a questionnaire. The assump-
tion that actually innocent prisoners will persist in contacting us may be mis-
guided; in particular, inmates suffering from depression, mental illnesses or
mental deficiencies might be unable to continue with their pleas for assistance.
Moreover, some prisoners might simply become discouraged by the rejection let-
ter and decide that further efforts would be fuitile.
82. Many state correctional facilities are in remote locations and institutional rules
on visitation may also impair face to face access with prospective clients. See
Suni, supra note 4, at 924 n.16.
83. We chose to craft a questionnaire that is rather brief (seven pages) on the
grounds that a lengthier document could overwhelm both writer and reader and
possibly hamper its very purpose as a sifting mechanism. The law school inno-
cence project questionnaires that I have seen range from roughly two pages to
seventeen. For copies of the questionnaires that are available on the internet,
please visit the websites listed above, supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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(who, where, when) and substantive ones (what, why). Although some
questionnaires start with broad, open-ended questions about the basis
for the prisoner's innocence claim, many begin with concrete questions
about the case-the place and date of conviction, names of the attor-
neys involved, types of post-conviction motions filed, documents
within the inmate's possession and so forth-and then lead into more
substantive issues.8 4 These substantive questions tend to seek details
about the conviction itself, such as the defense theory utilized at trial,
what evidence was collected during the police investigation, and if the
victim and/or other eyewitnesses identified the inmate.8 5 In addition,
the inmate is almost invariably asked to describe precisely why he is
innocent and, perhaps more importantly, list any evidence that could
support that claim.8 6
An interesting issue arises with respect to whether prisoners
should be asked to send supplemental materials (appellate briefs, po-
lice reports, etc.) along with the completed questionnaire. Since the
underlying rationale for questionnaires is to optimize the efficiency of
the case selection process by targeting information that pertains to
the project's intake standards, at first glance it appears counter-pro-
ductive to solicit additional documentation at that point. In fact,
many projects explicitly warn applicants not to send any extra written
materials unless and until they are requested to do so from a member
of the project.8 7 A problem with this approach, which became acute
for us over time and a source of contention among our students, is that
without any supplemental materials it may be difficult to gain a well-
balanced sense of the case; the shrewd applicant may slant his depic-
84. Id. The sequence of questions differs for each form, so any attempt on my part to
be definitive in characterizing them would be foolhardy. Some questionnaires
have procedural questions at the beginning; others start with more substantive
questions; others intermix technical or procedural questions with substantive
ones. For instance, the first question on the Innocence Project Northwest Screen-
ing Questionnaire is "Please describe briefly why your case should be taken by
Innocence Project Northwest. Explain why you are innocent and why you believe
you were wrongly convicted." http://www.law.washington.edu/ipnw/question-
naire.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2002). In contrast, the first question on the
Center on Wrongful Convictions' Intake Questionnaire asks: "Is there an impend-
ing filing deadline in your case? If so, explain." http://www.law.northwestern.
edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/newcases.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2002).
85. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Part I of the Northern California Inno-
cence Project Screening Questionnaire asks the applicant to "Briefly Describe the
Prosecution's Theory of Your Case at Trial" and "Briefly Describe the Defense's
Theory of Your Case at Trial." http://www.ncip.scu.edu/cases-we take.htm (last
visited Jan. 10, 2003).
86. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/faq.php#submissions (last vis-
ited Dec. 30, 2002).
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tion of events to bolster the chances for representation.8 8 Even more,
an inmate might be so familiar with his own case that he leaves out
important details in the questionnaire or he may not have the apti-
tude to express those details clearly. With the Second Look Program
Clinic, these concerns came to light after a series of occasions where
students, enthusiastic about an inmate's claim upon reviewing the
questionnaire, followed up by asking for copies of the appellate briefs
and then, after some delay due to the whims of the mail and inmate
response time, read the briefs and came away with their enthusiasm
dampened.
Reacting to student complaints, we decided to revise our question-
naire in the spring of 2002 to ask for copies of the appellate briefs
submitted by both the prosecution and the defense in the case. We
recognized this request could stall the process because prisoners often
have trouble photocopying their papers and it would take longer for us
to evaluate case files.8 9 The calculated risk we took was that the ben-
efit of having a clearer understanding of the case on the front end out-
weighed any detriment resulting from the increase in the time needed
to make an initial assessment. It is too soon to tell whether this initia-
tive will pay dividends, although students have told me that reading
the Statement of Facts sections from the briefs is extremely helpful in
piecing together the background of the case and reaching a prelimi-
nary prognosis about the strength of a prisoner's innocence claim.
The format, length, and content of a law school innocence project's
questionnaire are largely matters of taste, in the end. How much in-
formation does one need in order to diminish the amount of inmate
requests to a manageable quantity before proceeding to the next stage
of evaluation? Inasmuch as the answer to this question hinges on so
many project-specific intangibles (one's comfort level before making
rejections, the definition of manageable), I can only conclude that it is
important to view the questionnaire as a dynamic work-in-progress
with an editorial board consisting of clinic students and faculty
together.
c. Stage Three: The Preliminary Investigation
After a member of the project has reviewed an inmate's question-
naire and is intrigued by the case, but is not convinced the project
88. See Stiglitz et al., supra note 3, at 424 (stating that many "inmates have a great
deal of time and no disincentive to stop them from seeking the project's help, even
when they are guilty and the evidence of guilt is overwhelming"); see also Suni,
supra note 4, at 924-25 ("Virtually all work performed by innocence projects is
pro bono work .... As a result, there are few incentives on the part of incarcer-
ated individuals not to seek the assistance of such projects.").
89. Also, we anticipated that prisoners might send their original copies, a fear that
was later realized and added to our care-taking responsibilities.
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should accept it, the issue becomes determining exactly what the next
steps should be. Questionnaires are often accompanied by forms ask-
ing applicants to authorize the project to begin a preliminary investi-
gation while reserving for the project the right to withdraw from the
case at any time and for any reason.9 0 Many of these forms explicitly
seek permission for members of the project to discuss the case with
the prisoner's former attorneys, witnesses, and others. 9 1 In addition
to facilitating review of individual inquiries, the presence of an au-
thorization form offers institutional flexibility to re-direct a clinic's re-
sources in the event it discovers that a particular claim lacks merit
after the start of the investigation. 92
At this point in the evaluation process, students and faculty ordi-
narily begin to follow what David Protess has referred to as the "Paper
Trail" and the "People Trail."93 Reviewing the trial transcripts, police
reports, and appellate briefs obviously provides insight into the legal
and factual issues involved and may add to the list of people with
whom members of the project wish to speak. Phone calls to the in-
mate's previous attorneys can be especially valuable for students at
this stage, even if only to confirm whether their budding lawyering
instincts are on the mark or off-base. In my experience, attorneys are
almost always willing and occasionally eager to chat about their for-
mer clients and the legitimacy of their purported innocence claims.9 4
Of course, interviewing the inmate is vital. We always interview pris-
oners in person before committing to a case and prefer to subject them
to a polygraph test sooner rather than later.
During the preliminary investigation, members of innocence
projects should look for certain factors that may indicate innocence.9 5
90. See, e.g., http://www.hamline.edu/innocence/InmateApplication.htm (last visited
Dec. 30, 2002); http://www.law.wisc.edu/FJR/innocence/requesting-assis.htm
(last visited Dec. 30, 2002).
91. Id.; see also http://www.cwsl.edu/icda/i_Innocence.html (last visited Dec. 30,
2002).
92. To be fair, this trait may be beneficial to innocence projects, but not necessarily to
inmates. For example, a project's decision to stop investigating a case could send
a negative message to the public about the merits of the innocence claim. See
Suni, supra note 4, at 929-30.
93. David Protess of the Medill School of Journalism at Northwestern University dis-
cussed this method during his presentation at the North American Conference on
Wrongful Conviction Investigations in Rosemont, Illinois, in May 2001. See http:/
/www.caseclosedprod.com (last visited Jan. 10, 2003). Although Protess operates
a journalism-based innocence project, this investigative model seems useful for
law school innocence projects as well.
94. Frankly, this willingness is somewhat disturbing in terms of professional respon-
sibility and the duty of prior counsel to maintain client confidences even after the
conclusion of the lawyer's representation. See Suni, supra note 4, at 939-40.
Only rarely have we been asked to furnish a copy of the inmate's authorization
form before the lawyer will agree to talk.
95. See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 6.
[Vol. 81:10971122
ACTUAL INNOCENTS
While an analysis of these indicia is well beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, and recognizing that each case is unique, it is worth noting the
"Signs of Innocence" that Protess utilizes in gauging innocence claims:
a lack of physical evidence linking the defendant to the crime, the ex-
istence of an alibi, the absence of a credible confession and credible
eyewitnesses, and the defendant's background (i.e., a limited criminal
record).9 6
C. Ethical Issues and the Case Selection Process
The case selection process for law school innocence projects raises
important ethical concerns. 97 First, there is the issue of whether an
attorney-client relationship has been established before a project for-
mally agrees to handle an inmate's innocence claim, thereby creating
duties of confidentiality, competence, and diligence, among other obli-
gations. 98 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct authored by the
American Bar Association (ABA) offer little guidance in determining
when an attorney-client relationship originates, 99 although the Re-
statement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers suggests that such a
relationship can be created where
a person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that the lawyer provide
legal services for the person, and either (a) the lawyer manifests to the person
consent to do so; or (b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person reasonably relies
on the lawyer to provide the services .... 100
In the innocence project context, a prisoner's inquiry could be con-
strued as the manifestation of that person's intent for the project to
deliver legal services,10 1 and the project should be aware that the in-
mate-with few other outlets for assistance-may be relying on it to
do so. Moreover, the comments to the Restatement submit that law-
yers may demonstrate consent in multiple ways: "The lawyer may ex-
plicitly agree to represent the client or may indicate consent by action,
96. See http://www.truthinjustice.org/chart.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
97. See Suni, supra note 4. Most law school innocence projects endorse what Suni
terms either the "limited representation" or the "full representation" model. Id.
at 926-30. Under the "limited representation" model, which seems to be preva-
lent, a project only represents prisoners asserting claims of actual innocence and
may discontinue pursuit of an inmate's claim if that claim is found to lack merit.
Id. at 929-30. In contrast, the Center on Wrongful Convictions and the California
Innocence Project follow what Suni terms the "full representation" model
whereby "once these projects accept a case, they will see it through even if they
determine that there is not a credible claim of actual innocence .. .continued
belief in actual innocence is not a prerequisite for continued representation." Id.
at 928.
98. Id. at 931.
99. Id. at 931-32.
100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERs § 14 (2000).
101. See Suni, supra note 4, at 932.
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for example by performing services requested by the client."102 As a
result, it may be critical to clarify without equivocation to interested
prisoners that the project does not consent to provide representation
unless and until it notifies the inmate that it wishes to establish an
attorney-client relationship. To avoid the inadvertent creation of this
relationship, some questionnaire authorization forms specify that,
while the clinic intends to begin a preliminary investigation, it is not
representing the inmate.10 3 Additionally, all members of the project
(faculty, students, and staff) should make a distinct effort at the pre-
liminary investigation stage to shun using language or undertaking
actions that might cause a prisoner to believe representation has
commenced. 104
Second, provided that an attorney-client relationship does not
arise inadvertently during the case selection process, a question re-
mains as to whether a duty of confidentiality nonetheless arises.'
0 5
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14, cmt. e (2000).
103. For instance, our form asks inmates to consent to the following provision: "I un-
derstand that by conducting an initial investigation, the Second Look Program is
not agreeing to represent me." See also Suni, supra note 4, at 934 ("[Dlisclaimers
should clearly state that any information being collected is for screening purposes
only and does not indicate that representation has been undertaken."). When I
presented a version of this paper at the Clinical Theory Workshop at New York
Law School in the fall of 2002, several participants expressed concerns about the
tendency of innocence projects to treat inmates as "non-clients" during the case
selection process and suggested the possibility of entering into limited retainer
agreements for the duration of the preliminary investigation. Similar concerns
were raised briefly during the National Innocence Projects Conference at Califor-
nia Western School of Law in January 2002. See Suni, supra note 4, at 922 n.9.
My impression is that it would be difficult for an innocence project to comply with
the increased obligations created by the formation of attorney-client relationships
with hundreds, perhaps thousands, of inmates during the case selection process.
Would a project be required to engage in a diligent and zealous preliminary in-
vestigation for each and every case? If so, what would that entail? Even more,
the benefits of such arrangements may not be extremely significant given that
the attorney-client privilege would still apply to confidential communications
with prospective clients. See infra notes 105-13 and accompanying text. There
should certainly be more discussion of this issue, however, in light of the poten-
tial harm to inmates. See, e.g., Suni, supra note 4, at 929-30 ("[Ilf a project has
been known to be actively involved in the investigation of a case, will its failure to
pursue that case be construed to reflect a belief that the inmate may not be
innocent?").
104. See Suni, supra note 4, at 933-34.
105. For information about the duty of confidentiality, see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983). The ABA House of Delegates adopted a new Model Rule
in February 2002 explicitly termed "Duties to Prospective Client." See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18 (2002); Elizabeth Cohen, The Less You Know
... New Model Rule Clarified Obligations to Prospective Clients, A.B.A. J., Dec.
2002, at 62. Model Rule 1.18 explains that, first, "[a] person who discusses with a
lawyer the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a
matter is a prospective client" and, second, generally "[e]ven when no client-law-
yer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has had discussions with a prospective
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The applicable rules suggest that a lawyer's duty to protect informa-
tion may attach prior to initiating actual representation, that is, dur-
ing preliminary consultations with a prospective client about whether
to offer legal assistance.10 6 Therefore, essentially any information
procured during the questionnaire and preliminary investigation
phases by an innocence project should be treated as confidential and
only disclosed with the consent of the inmate.10 7 To protect this infor-
mation, Ellen Suni urges innocence projects to treat correspondence
with prisoners as "legal mail."1os This allows project correspondence
to circumvent the ordinary processing method, in which correctional
facilities often open and read prisoner mail, because legal mail typi-
cally is not read by prison staff and must be opened in the inmate's
presence.109
Third, it is generally recognized that confidential communications
made in the course of consultations with potential clients are privi-
leged irrespective of whether representation is eventually undertaken
and, thus, shielded from compelled disclosure.11O The attorney-client
privilege, however, applies only (1) to confidential information ob-
tained from the client for the purpose of procuring legal assistance"'
and (2) in judicial or other proceedings where a lawyer may be called
as a witness or otherwise ordered to furnish evidence relating to a cli-
ent.iN2 Accordingly, in the unlikely event that a member of an inno-
client shall not use or reveal information learned in the consultation ...."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18(a)-(b); see also Suni, supra note 4, at
936-37.
106. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18; Suni, supra note 4, at 936-37; see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 15(1)(a) (2000);
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 90-358 (1990) (stat-
ing that when a potential client in good faith consults an attorney with the goal of
obtaining legal advice or representation, the duty of confidentiality under Model
Rule 1.6 may arise even if the lawyer provides no legal services and declines the
request for representation).
107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 15(1)(a) (2000),
62; Suni, supra note 4, at 938. This duty should apply to information that relates
to the representation of the client and is not generally known, even if it derives
from third parties whose communications are not protected by the attorney-client
privilege. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59, cmt. b.
108. Suni, supra note 4, at 938-39.
109. Id. Designating correspondence as "legal mail" should also allow a project to com-
ply with the duty to take "reasonable precautions" to guard against disclosure to
unintended recipients. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2000); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60, cmt. d (2000).
110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70, cmt. c (2000);
Suni, supra note 4, at 937-38.
111. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 69 (4th ed. 1999); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 68-72 (2000).
112. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. 3. Suni observes that
"[d]ocuments are covered only to the extent they manifest protected communica-
tions. Information contained in the questionnaires and requests for assistance
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cence project is subpoenaed as a witness in a proceeding against an
inmate whose request for assistance was evaluated by the project, the
privilege could not be asserted regarding information obtained from
people other than the inmate unless they qualify as agents of the
inmate. 113
Finally, for projects that restrict their intake to actual innocence
claims and assert a right to cease representation on a case they have
selected if they later determine the claim lacks merit, there may be a
threshold issue regarding whether this limitation is ethically
proper. 114 The Model Rules and the Restatement indicate that law-
yers may impose reasonable limits on the scope of representation with
the informed consent of the client. 115 As Suni concludes, given the
constraints on resources, "there is likely nothing unreasonable about
projects limiting the kinds of cases they will take or continue to pur-
sue ... as long as the potential consequences are clearly understood"
by the prisoner. 116
Although additional ethical questions may surface during the case
selection process,117 law school innocence projects should be able to
provided by the inmate would be subject to privilege, while the underlying docu-
ments and records in the case would not." Suni, supra note 4, at 938.
113. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70, cmt. f(2000) ("A
person is a confidential agent for communication if the person's participation is
reasonably necessary to facilitate the client's communication with a lawyer or
another privileged person and if the client reasonably believes that the person
will hold the communication in confidence."). Frequently, relatives and friends
contact an innocence project on behalf of a prisoner and it could be argued that
such conduct is "reasonably necessary to facilitate" communication with the in-
mate (a prospective client) in light of the restricted access to the telephone, visita-
tion, and the use of mail in correctional facilities. See supra note 82 and
accompanying text. If the third party is not deemed an agent, however, the com-
munications are not confidential and not privileged. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERs § 70, cmt. e (2000).
114. Suni, supra note 4, at 929-30, 961-62.
115. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 19(1) (2000); see also Suni, supra note 4, at 929 n.39, 961-
62.
116. Suni, supra note 4, at 962.
117. See generally Suni, supra note 4, at 945-69. The duty to avoid conflicts of interest
applies generally only where representation has already commenced, but, as Suni
notes, this issue may affect the screening process, such as when co-defendants
both seek assistance from the same innocence project or when an inmate request-
ing help is also a witness or suspect in another case being reviewed by the project.
Id. at 945-55. For instance, new Model Rule 1.18 specifies that a lawyer "shall
not represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective
client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received infor-
mation from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that per-
son in the matter...." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18(c) (2002); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 15(2) (2000). To
guard against potential problems in this area, Suni mentions the possibility of
using advance waivers and advises installing a conflict-checking system for the
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comply with their professional obligations to prisoners in the preselec-
tion phase by taking care to clarify throughout the process that the
project is not representing the inmate (until that decision is made),
and to guard against the disclosure of information. To the extent that
some element of disclosure is necessary to conduct a preliminary in-
vestigation, which it invariably is, the common practice of affixing an
authorization form to the questionnaire and asking inmates to sign
and return it may be prudent.1 ' 8
Seeking referrals from trusted lawyers, reviewing detailed ques-
tionnaire forms, and traipsing down some stretch of the Paper and
People Trails, while simultaneously abiding by one's ethical obliga-
tions, can assist members of an innocence project in reaching a level of
comfort about the legitimacy of a prisoner's claim before accepting the
case and plunging full-bore into the investigation. Even so, it strikes
me that a project's decision about taking on a client-in a non-DNA
case, at least-ultimately has a lot to do with instinct. As William
Hellerstein often says, drawing on his forty years of criminal defense
practice, it is the amount of detail in the inmate's correspondence, the
credibility displayed during the prison interview, and a sense of
"smell" that often convinces him a particular case warrants our ser-
vices. One of the most fascinating aspects of the innocence project
case selection process concerns whether the fresh, eager nostrils of
clinic students are well-equipped to bear primary responsibility for
this smell test. Regardless of the answer, the educational benefits of
involving students in case selection must be examined.
III. PEDAGOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
At first blush, it is unclear whether an innocence project is a desir-
able educational setting for a law school clinic. The fundamental pre-
mise behind clinical legal education is that students learn best
regular entry of the names of defendants, co-defendants, and witnesses involved
in the cases under review. Suni, supra note 4, at 952-54. Suni also suggests that
projects be mindful of potential conflicts related to the project's staff. Id. at 954-
60. As for other duties, the obligations to act with competence and diligence, and
to keep clients reasonably informed, would appear only to attach upon formation
of an attorney-client relationship. Id. at 960-63. Suni warns, though, that
projects should not neglect these duties entirely for matters in the midst of
screening; where advice is given at all, a lawyer must use reasonable care in ren-
dering it and inmates should not be "led to discontinue other sources of possible
relief in reliance on timely screening." Id. at 963-64. Efforts by project attorneys
to offer "quasi-representation" during the preselection phase, such as ghost-
writing pleadings or making communications on the inmate's behalf, may raise
questions about the scope of the attorney's authority, among other issues. Id. at
964-67.
118. In theory, there could be an issue regarding whether the forms commonly used by
innocence projects are sufficient to allow inmates to provide informed consent,
especially in situations involving mentally deficient or illiterate prisoners.
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through experience-the process of doing legal work under the super-
vision of attorneys and reflecting upon that work allows students to
hone their legal skills and prepare themselves for life beyond the
classroom.119 Recognizing that learning is often enhanced where stu-
dents bear primary responsibility for a case and are forced to engage
in autonomous decisionmaking, most clinicians have embraced the
concept of "non-directive" supervision12O-giving students wide lati-
tude in devising and implementing lawyering tasks and only interven-
ing when it is necessary to preserve their clients' interests.121
Innocence cases, however, are among the most time-consuming
and cumbersome matters to litigate,122 much less navigate politically,
and their inherent unpredictability makes it difficult for supervisors
to cede control of case strategy and to foresee what skills a student
might glean from working on them. Furthermore, the unusual proce-
dural posture of these cases-in essence, the effort to revive a dor-
mant matter-suggests the experiences in the clinic might not
translate directly into the students' likely practice areas and lawyer-
ing tasks after graduation. Still, it is my belief that law school inno-
cence projects can serve the pedagogical goals of clinical legal
education. In particular, involving students deeply in the case selec-
tion process can help compensate for a potentially lackluster educa-
119. See, e.g., William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching for the New
Clinical Law Professor: A View from the First Floor, 28 AKRON L. REV. 463, 475
(1995) ("The single most critical defining element of clinical education is that it is
experience-based learning ... that students learn most effectively by participat-
ing in their own education by actually representing people."); see also Margaret
Martin Barry et al., Clinical Education for this Millennium: The Third Wave, 7
CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 17-18 (2000); Kenneth R. Kreiling, Clinical Education and
Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learning to Learn from Experience Through
Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV. 284 (1981).
120. See James H. Stark et al., Directiveness in Clinical Supervision, 3 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 35 (1993).
121. For a discussion of the tension in clinical teaching between the theory of non-
directive supervision and the professional demands of client representation, see
George Critchlow, Professional Responsibility, Student Practice, and the Clinical
Teacher's Duty to Intervene, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 415 (1991); see also Stark et al.,
supra note 120, at 45-47 (describing the difficulty many clinicians have in squar-
ing their commitment to non-directive supervision with the desire to provide out-
standing legal services to clients).
122. Working on DNA claims in jurisdictions that provide for post-conviction testing
may be somewhat less difficult. See Stiglitz et al., supra note 3, at 424. Never-
theless, legal and practical obstacles often impede attempts to exonerate inmates
through DNA testing, particularly statutes of limitations on motions based on
newly discovered evidence and problems in simply trying to obtain the evidence.
See Scheck & Neufeld, supra note 38, at 244-45. As Scheck and Neufeld point
out, "[i]n 75 percent of [Cardozo] Innocence Project cases, matters in which it has
been established that a favorable DNA result would be sufficient to vacate the
inmate's conviction, the relevant biological evidence has either been destroyed or
lost." Id. at 245.
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tional experience in litigating an innocence case and offer each
student a valuable learning tool in its own right.
A. Pedagogical Goals and Supervisory Methods for Law
School Clinics: A Brief Look
Clinical legal education grew in the 1960s and 1970s primarily to
address two major concerns: the lack of opportunities for students to
develop practical skills via the traditional law school curriculum1
2 3
and the dearth of adequate legal representation for the poor. 124 His-
torically, in-house law school clinics where students labor on behalf of
indigent clients under faculty supervision have attempted to fill both
of these chasms. The dual aims of most clinics, though, do not always
overlap; the clinical teacher often must struggle to reconcile her peda-
gogical objectives for the student with her professional responsibility
as an advocate for the client. 12 5
In terms of pedagogical objectives, law school clinics are typically
designed to help students gain one or more of the skills required in the
practice of law.126 Over time, clinicians and others have pinpointed a
series of specific talents that clinics should aspire to help law students
develop. The MacCrate Report, the product of an extensive probe into
the state of legal education in the late 1980s and early 1990s, formu-
lated a Statement of Fundamental Lawyering Skills and Professional
Values that students ought to accrue during law school: problem solv-
ing, legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, factual investiga-
tion, communication, counseling, negotiation, litigation and
alternative dispute resolution procedures, organization and manage-
ment of legal work, and recognizing and resolving ethical dilem-
mas.127 During the same period, the American Association of Law
123. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Century Per-
spective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612, 615 (1984) (discussing the failure of the tradi-
tional law school curriculum, with its emphasis on appellate case reading and
interpretation, to prepare students for the hazards of practicing law). Evidently,
the "first wave of clinical legal education" in the early 1900s surfaced largely in
reaction to the emergence of the casebook method in the 1890s. Barry et al.,
supra note 119, at 5.
124. See Legal Education and Professional Development-An Educational Continuum:
Report of The Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap,
1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMIssIONS TO B. xi [hereinafter MacCrate Re-
port]; Barry et al., supra note 119, at 12-16.
125. See Critchlow, supra note 121.
126. Of course, the precise goals vary from clinic to clinic. For a discussion of the
teaching goals that Philip Schrag and his colleagues identified for the Center for
Applied Legal Studies at Georgetown Law School, see Schrag, supra note 15, at
179-86.
127. See MacCrate Report, supra note 124.
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Schools (AALS) Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic set
forth nine chief goals of clinical education.128
Depending on personal preferences and the challenges of a particu-
lar clinic, teachers rely on a mixture of techniques to convey the prac-
tical skills they are entrusted with transmitting to students as a part
of (and occasionally as a supplement to) supervising casework. 129
While exposure to practical skills through working on actual and/or
simulated cases in the role of a lawyer is a crucial component of
clinical legal education,13o many instructors aim to go beyond that
and encourage students to learn from their experiences, generally
through the process of evaluation and self-reflection.13 1 Again, those
128. See Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 508, 511-17 (1992) ((1) developing modes of planning and analysis for deal-
ing with unstructured situations as opposed to the "pre-digested world of the ap-
pellate case;" (2) providing professional skills instruction in such necessary areas
as interviewing, counseling, and fact investigation; (3) teaching means of learn-
ing from experience; (4) instructing students in professional responsibility by giv-
ing first-hand exposure to actual mores of the profession; (5) exposing students to
the demands and methods of acting in the role of the attorney; (6) providing op-
portunities for collaborative learning; (7) imparting the obligation of service to
clients, information about how to engage in such representation, and knowledge
concerning the impact of the legal system on poor people; (8) providing the oppor-
tunity to examine the impact of doctrine on real life and providing a laboratory in
which students and faculty study particular areas of the law; and (9) critiquing
the capacities and limitations of lawyers and the legal system).
129. For instance, Peter Hoffman notes how clinicians may engage in a discussion of a
case (dialectic teaching); provide information to the student (didactic teaching);
evaluate a student's lawyering skills (evaluation); demonstrate the method of
performing a lawyering task (demonstration) or a combination of these ap-
proaches. Peter Toll Hoffman, The Stages of the Clinical Supervisory Relation-
ship, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 301, 302 (1986). Robert Condlin suggests clinicians should
incorporate "learning mode" behavior into their teaching, which he describes as
"inquiry, the process of obtaining information about others' statements; owning
up, the process of sharing with others both intellectual and emotional reactions to
their statements; and testing, the process of eliciting and assessing reaction to
one's own views in order to decide whether to agree or disagree." Robert J.
Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes: Substituting Persuasion for Learning in Clinical
Practice Instruction, 40 MD. L. REV. 223, 235 (1981).
130. Minna Kotkin has dissected the "role assumption" archetype of clinical teach-
ing-in which "the student acts in the role of a lawyer representing a real or
imaginary client"-questioning the notion that all students learn effectively
through this method. Minna J. Kotkin, Reconsidering Role Assumption in
Clinical Education, 19 N.M. L. REV. 185 (1989). Some students may struggle to
immerse themselves and learn from performing lawyering tasks, and may profit
by first observing someone else conducting the activity, i.e., a supervisor provid-
ing a "role model." Id. at 196-202. A potential pitfall with role modeling, how-
ever, is that when the client representation starts with the teacher in role as the
attorney "the dynamic of authority... may be irrevocable." Id. at 201.
131. See, e.g., Barry et al., supra note 119, at 17 (describing how self-reflection in
clinical teaching methodology is exemplified in the work of Donald Schon and his
concept of "reflective practice" or "reflection in action"); see also Kreiling, supra
note 119, at 288-306; Nina W. Tarr, The Skill of Evaluation as an Explicit Goal of
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who embrace this concept employ diverse methods for teaching the
skill of self-reflection, ranging from holding periodic post-mortem ses-
sions analyzing how a student fared in handling an aspect of a case to
requiring that students keep a journal about their clinic activities.132
It is through this process of evaluation, many assert, that students
truly sharpen their practical legal skills and obtain a mechanism for
deconstructing and learning from their experiences that will permit
them to improve their skills continually over the course of their
careers.
13 3
Much of the scholarship regarding clinical teaching methodology
has focused on the nature of the supervisory relationship. 134 The de-
bate turns principally on the extent to which supervisors should offer
direction in overseeing student work. 135 On the one hand, advocates
of "directive" supervision suggest that providing detailed guidance to
students-and sometimes even taking over primary responsibility for
a case themselves-ensures that students do not flounder excessively
and lose faith in their abilities.1 36 Directiveness in student supervi-
Clinical Training, 21 PAC. L.J. 967 (1990). Amy Ziegler suggests that, although
no single method of teaching will steer students toward the insight needed for
this reflective practice, each clinical activity offers a chance for students to ex-
amine their assumptions, goals, expectations, purposes, and decisions. Amy L.
Ziegler, Developing a System of Evaluation in Clinical Legal Teaching, 42 J. LE-
GAL EDUC. 575, 576 (1992).
132. To encourage contemplation, many clinicians ask students to keep a reflective
journal. See J.P. Ogilvy, The Use of Journals in Legal Education: A Tool for Re-
flection, 3 CLINICAL L. REV. 55 (1996). For a discussion of the evaluation methods
used in one clinic, the Housing Law Clinic at St. Louis University Law School, see
Ziegler, supra note 131, at 585-90.
133. See, e.g., Kreiling, supra note 119, at 284 ("Clinical education should reach be-
yond skills training to provide the students with a method for future learning
from their experiences."). For an analysis of the process of providing feedback as
part of a law school clinic, see Victor M. Goode, There is a Method(ology) to this
Madness: A Review and Analysis of Feedback in the Clinical Process, 53 OKLA. L.
REV. 223 (2000).
134. Schrag, supra note 15, at 213-14 (observing that supervisory methodology has
been the subject of clinical scholarship perhaps more than any other topic); see,
e.g., Hoffman, supra note 129; Michael Meltsner et al., The Bike Tour Leader's
Dilemma: Talking About Supervision, 13 VT. L. REV. 399 (1989).
135. The process of supervision and evaluation is what separates clinical legal educa-
tion from the relatively unstructured practical experiences that students might
have by working in law offices over the summer or after graduation. See Peter
Toll Hoffman, Clinical Course Design and the Supervisory Process, 1982 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 277, 280; see also Ziegler, supra note 131, at 575 ("The evaluation methodol-
ogy distinguishes a clinic from a legal internship, clerkship, or associate position
where assignments are given without detailed instructions and where feedback,
beyond the supervisor's expression of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, is
incidental.").
136. See Schrag, supra note 15, at 213; see also Hoffman, supra note 129, at 304 (dis-
cussing how supervisors may need to be directive at the beginning of a clinical
course to avoid fueling student anxiety).
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sion is often justified by references to the primacy of rendering top-
notch legal services to clients, even if that means the educational aims
for the student must take a backseat.137
On the other hand, proponents of "non-directive" supervision, who
tend to predominate within the current ranks of clinical faculty,13s
insist that students learn best by engaging in their own decisionmak-
ing about a case and by doing nearly everything themselves.13 9 Non-
directive supervisors lean toward fostering student independence and
responsibility above all, often expressing reluctance to intervene in a
matter unless absolutely necessary.140 Furthermore, offering stu-
dents significant freedom in performing lawyering tasks, some schol-
ars attest, comports with adult learning theory-"andragogy" as
opposed to "pedagogy"14 1-and the tendency of adults to absorb mate-
rial most effectively as active participants in their own education in "a
spirit of mutuality between teachers and students as joint inquir-
ers."142 Under this view, a clinical teacher-student relationship based
on mutuality is a more egalitarian relationship and, for most students,
is a welcome respite from the hierarchical interactions they have with
other members of the law school faculty.14 3
Most clinicians, however, do not fall at either extreme of the direc-
tive/non-directive spectrum, but rather rest at some point along the
continuum.144 Studies have indicated that many self-identified non-
directive supervisors are more directive than they intend or wish to
be.145 Likewise, supervisors may be more comfortable assuming a
137. See Stark et al., supra note 120, at 57 (stating that directive respondents showed
a greater commitment to best possible client service than non-directive respon-
dents and seemed less willing to compromise this goal).
138. Id. at 35.
139. See, e.g., Schrag, supra note 15, at 213-14.
140. See Stark et al., supra note 120, at 38-42, 58.
141. See Frank S. Bloch, The Andragogical Basis of Clinical Legal Education, 35
VAND. L. REV. 321 (1982).
142. Id. at 330 (discussing the theories of Malcolm S. Knowles). Bloch suggests that
"[p]roper implementation of andragogical methodology in a law school clinical
setting requires that clinical faculty supervise students closely and directly," but
admonishes that "the possibility always exists that mutual inquiry will be for-
saken and that the teacher will take control of the representation by lecturing to
the student and directing him or her to do what the teacher knows-or has deter-
mined-must be done." Id. at 348-49. In Bloch's view, "[an andragogical model
would specifically discourage this type of supervision, except to the extent that it
is necessary to ensure competent representation in a particular case." Id. at 349.
143. See Kathleen A. Sullivan, Self-Disclosure, Separation, and Students: Intimacy in
the Clinical Relationship, 27 IND. L. REV. 115, 123 (1993).
144. Everyone who has chimed in on the subject seems to agree that some level of
supervision is required in clinical methodology; the issue relates to the scope and
nature of that supervision. See Stark et al., supra note 120.
145. See id. at 61-62 (noting that "even among nondirective supervisors, only twenty
percent said that they 'often' allow students to make decisions that go against
their views," and citing client interests and time pressures as the key factors in
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non-directive role with respect to certain lawyering tasks-and cer-
tain individual students-than with others.146 Indeed, Stacy Caplow
has observed that "[w]hile the received wisdom among live-client clini-
cians tends to favor non-directive supervision, this is one area in
which our instructional philosophy may romanticize our reality."147
Moreover, the degree of directiveness that a faculty member
utilizes in supervising students frequently shifts in response to the
progression of a student's skills during the clinic.148 At the start of a
clinical course, students regularly feel unprepared and overwhelmed,
eager to receive information and instruction. 149 Over time, most stu-
dents reach a point where they display greater confidence and assume
greater responsibility for their cases, a period marked by the need for
a more collaborative relationship with their supervisor.150 Ideally,
students eventually reach a stage in which they are functionally act-
ing as lawyers, with supervisors guarding against only grave er-
rors.15 1 Although each student advances at a different rate and with
varying results, Peter Hoffman has commented that students usually
demand greater freedom over the course of the supervisory relation-
ship and, if a supervisor balks at gradually relinquishing control, the
outcome for students might be dependency, rebellion and, worse yet, a
failure to internalize the skills being taught.152
supervisors behaving more directively than they should). Moreover, a supervi-
sor's inclination to be non-directive may be tempered somewhat in states where
the student practice rules prescribe that clinicians assume joint responsibility for
casework and specifically list the responsibilities of the instructor. See Catherine
Gage O'Grady, Preparing Students for the Profession: Clinical Education, Collab-
orative Pedagogy, and the Realities of Practice for the New Lawyer, 4 CLINICAL L.
REV. 485, 515 (1998).
146. See, e.g., Stark et al., supra note 120, at 44 ("While a large majority of respon-
dents favored nondirective supervision of initial client interviews, only a minority
endorsed a nondirective approach towards students' written work."). Also, since
students learn differently, supervisors frequently must tailor their degree of
directiveness to correspond with individual learning styles and abilities. See,
e.g., Quigley, supra note 119, at 486-87 (stating that some students may become
"deer caught in the headlights" and need more guidance).
147. Caplow, supra note 19, at 27; see also Quigley, supra note 119, at 485 ("Divining
the appropriate mix of freedom and direction/control in the student-teacher rela-
tionship is one of the ongoing challenges of clinical educators.").
148. Hoffman, supra note 129, at 302 ("What may be effective supervision at the be-
ginning of the course may, for instance, become stifling and overly restrictive by
the end of the semester.").
149. See id. at 303-07; Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Scenes from a Clinic, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33 (1978) ("Most members of the group usually resent the super-
visors' decision to thrust so much responsibility on them, but they are unable to
express this resentment at first.").
150. Hoffman, supra note 129, at 307-09.
151. Id. at 309-10.
152. Id. at 310.
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Even if a student reaches a level of lawyering competency at which
she needs minimal supervision, live-client clinics can still pose dilem-
mas for clinical teachers when their visions of what is educationally
valuable for the student clash with their assessments of the profes-
sional duties owed to the client.153 In an article presenting the results
of a survey they conducted about the measure of directiveness exerted
by clinical supervisors, James Stark, Jon Bauer, and James Papillo
remarked that "[a]lmost all clinicians feel substantial conflict about
their competing obligations to students and clients,"154 and "[m]ost
clinicians also indicated that they behave more directively with stu-
dents than they think they should, and cited concerns about client
welfare as the primary reason."155 Meticulous faculty direction and
even intervention in a case may benefit the client, but often at an edu-
cational price to the student.156
In a nutshell, live-client clinics are generally geared toward help-
ing students gain many of the practical skills they will need to succeed
as lawyers, while at the same time trying to aid an under-served client
population. There are lingering questions, however, regarding the
best way to impart these skills, with the crux of the controversy sur-
rounding the degree of direction that supervisors should provide and
the manner in which supervisors should resolve the occasional colli-
sion between educational objectives and client service obligations.
Just as clinicians continue to wrestle with these questions, they con-
tinue to explore new outlets for teaching lawyering skills, aiming to
formulate innovative clinics that correlate with the changing, fluid na-
ture of legal practice.15 7 It remains to be seen whether innocence
projects are an appropriate forum for law school clinics in the twenty-
first century; my sense, though, is that they can be.
153. See Critchlow, supra note 121, at 415-16 (suggesting this situation could create
"role confusion and professional conflict" for the teacher); see also Quigley, supra
note 119, at 485 (stating that this tension stems from the supervisor's "responsi-
bility as a teacher to the student to allow her to take maximum control of the case
and learn by the fullest possible experience of representing the client versus the
ethical responsibility of the lawyer-teacher to their client to make sure the cli-
ent's interests are well served").
154. Stark et al., supra note 120, at 66.
155. Id. at 47.
156. Id. at 67 ("If the clinician takes over aspects of the case, the student may feel that
she has 'failed.'").
157. See Barry et al., supra note 119, at 51-71 (discussing how law school clinics may
need to adapt to changes in technology, demographics, and globalism, as well as
shifts in the nature of law practice).
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B. The Educational Value of Involving Students in Case
Selection for Innocence Projects: A Close Look
1. Student Experiences in Handling Innocence Cases: An
Educational Mixed Bag
Working on post-conviction cases of actual innocence, in theory,
constitutes fertile terrain for students to cultivate practical skills
while also offering legal assistance to an impoverished segment of the
population, thereby advancing two main goals of clinical legal educa-
tion. Optimally, the experience of serving as an advocate for innocent
prisoners contains a heavy dose of fact investigation, interviewing,
and counseling as well as some portion of the techniques-legal analy-
sis, research, and writing-developed in traditional appellate clin-
ics.158 Exposure to the criminal justice system and to the general
skills of organization and time management are other potential re-
wards of working in an innocence project.159 Students may also con-
front and be asked to solve ethical quandaries, an integral part of
teaching professional responsibility.160 Moreover, especially in the
context of non-DNA claims, work in this field offers training in the art
of creative problem solving ("thinking outside the box") because these
cases often lack a clear trajectory.161 Finally, merely participating in
an innocence project and striving toward the exoneration of a wrong-
fully convicted prisoner has a certain intrinsic value: a chance for a
student to associate herself with a socially desirable objective and, ac-
cordingly, derive some personal fulfillment from that association.
Nevertheless, the pedagogical problem with many actual innocence
claims is that it is difficult to anticipate at the outset whether any
particular case may be worthwhile for students. For innocence
projects, the educational component of the matters chosen for repre-
sentation is often a secondary consideration; there is an element of
"take what you can get" with innocence claims and there are usually
not enough meritorious claims within a project's specific mandate to
158. See Stiglitz et al., supra note 3, at 430-31 (describing the range of skills involved
in innocence cases, including writing, grappling with multiple legal issues simul-
taneously, fact investigation, organization and time management, and exposure
to the major participants in the criminal justice system). For a discussion of some
of the skills developed in an appellate clinic, see Laflin, supra note 64, at 19-46.
159. See Stiglitz et al., supra note 3, at 430-31.
160. See Suni, supra note 4; Hoffman, supra note 135, at 291.
161. Stiglitz and his colleagues comment that "the lawyering skills learned by having
students work exclusively on DNA cases is limited, particularly in a state ...
where there is a statute that provides for DNA testing." Stiglitz et al., supra note
3, at 424. Even in such cases, however, tracking down the biological evidence
might necessitate strategic planning and creative thinking. See supra note 122
and accompanying text.
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provide the luxury of picking them based on educational value. 162
Prior to receiving our first set of students for the Second Look Pro-
gram Clinic, William Hellerstein and I worked all summer to find via-
ble cases, 163 agonizing that we would be unable to discover a sufficient
number of legitimate claims of actual innocence to assign to our stu-
dents, let alone cases that presaged a gratifying clinical experience.
Frankly, our judgment of each claim's legal and factual strength
eclipsed any pedagogical concerns.
This case selection method differs significantly from the process for
most in-house clinics, especially trial and appellate offerings, which
typically put the perceived educational attributes of a case at or near
the top of their screening charts. 164 Kenneth Kreiling has argued
that, to facilitate experiential learning, supervisors should make
preselected cases available for students at the start of a clinical course
and should bear three major factors in mind when choosing these
cases. 165 First, the cases should contribute materially to the goals of
the course. 166 Second, they should be selected such that, to the extent
possible, their initial demands upon the students follow or at least co-
incide with the classroom component.16 7 Third, the tasks that must
be performed in the near future should be sequenced so they will be
within the capacity of the student with adequate faculty supervi-
sion. 168 As part of ruminating about case selection, scholars have also
162. Stiglitz et al., supra note 3, at 425 ("[Glood cases (i.e. cases with a believable,
provable, and procedurally viable claim of innocence) are relatively rare.").
163. We did not involve any students in this part of the case selection process because,
on a practical level, we did not have any students yet and wanted to give them
preselected cases to begin working on in the fall.
164. See, e.g., Duquette, supra note 64, at 9 ("The primary criterion for case selection
must be legal education."). Educational considerations are rarely, if ever, the sole
basis for selecting a case. Maureen Laflin explains that cases for the Appellate
Clinic at the University of Idaho College of Law are chosen for "their educational
value, student availability, the time constraints of the project, the interests and
expertise of the clinical faculty and the law faculty in general and the client's
prospects for securing other legal representation. The individual goals, interests,
and capabilities of the available students also factor into case selection." Laflin,
supra note 64, at 9-10.
165. Kreiling, supra note 119, at 320-22.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. Kreiling's model, though noble in intent, may be difficult to realize. See Hoff-
man, supra note 135, at 290 ("Given the inherent variability of real cases, their
use in role assumption creates problems of providing uniform experiences as well
as achieving orderly learning. The larger the variation in each student's clinical
experience, the more difficult it becomes to achieve the goals of the course and the
greater the necessity for the teacher to show flexibility in responding to the learn-
ing needs of the class.").
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analyzed the respective educational merits of selecting complex, "big"
cases versus more discrete, "small" cases for students.169
To be sure, estimating the educational value of an individual case
might be an area where the norm does not match the ideal-speculat-
ing about the future course of a case and the succession of tasks in-
volved might be a matter better left to a psychic than a lawyer, but I
imagine experienced clinicians are quite adept at such prognostica-
tions. More to the point, selecting cases with high educational value is
a worthy goal for clinics in general and arguably the most critical as-
pect of an effective clinical program. 170 If the cases lack educational
value, students will miss out not only on a learning opportunity but
also on the chance to apply their clinical experience to their future
careers. 171
Given that educational considerations are not always paramount
in ultimately selecting cases for representation by an innocence pro-
ject, it should not be a revelation that students have mixed learning
experiences in handling those cases. During our first year in opera-
tion, the 2001-2002 academic year, we divided the eight students en-
rolled in the Second Look Program Clinic into pairs and assigned each
team one of the four cases that we had vetted over the summer and
decided to pursue.172 In short, the teams received the following cases:
* Team 1: An inner-city murder from 1991 in which two teenagers
allegedly shot an off-duty corrections officer during a carjacking.
We decided to intervene on behalf of one co-defendant, with the
other co-defendant still represented by the zealous public defender
who had argued the direct appeal years before. Our case rested
chiefly on the purported eyewitness testimony of a felon who
claimed that two other men had committed the crime.
" Team 2: A robbery at a suburban restaurant in 1999 where the per-
petrator evidently stole money from a cashier at knife-point. The
cashier did not identify the defendant at trial and testified that the
perpetrator was "taller and fatter" than the defendant. Moreover,
the defense had information suggesting that, at around the time of
this incident, a taller, fatter man with facial features resembling
169. See Duquette, supra note 64, at 9; Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Report
from a CLEPR Colony, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 581, 589-90 (1976); Schrag, supra note
15, at 191-92.
170. See Duquette, supra note 64, at 8-9 (stating that selecting the right mix of cases
is perhaps the most important ingredient of a good clinical program). It could be
argued that giving students cases that lack extensive opportunities to perform
lawyering activities is not altogether bad; to some extent it emulates what fre-
quently occurs in practice, e.g., the corporate transaction that "blows up" before
reaching the negotiating table.
171. See Bloch, supra note 141, at 350-51 (discussing the importance of selecting cases
for their educational value because of application to future careers).
172. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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those of the defendant had committed a string of robberies in the
vicinity, but the judge deemed this evidence inadmissible. The only
evidence connecting the defendant to the crime, which the jury ap-
parently credited, came in the form of the testimony of the restau-
rant's cook, who identified the defendant at trial. We entered the
case while the direct appeal was still pending and received carte
blanche from the assigned public defender to begin our own investi-
gation and, later, to substitute ourselves as appellate counsel.
" Team 3: A 1984 murder outside an urban "base house" where co-
caine was sold and consumed. Our client's conviction rested almost
entirely on the accusations of an alleged eyewitness who had re-
ceived a reduced sentence on a pending drug charge in exchange for
his testimony. The co-defendant in the murder case consistently
maintained, first to his lawyer and then in a post-conviction pro-
ceeding, that he had acted alone and that our client had not been
involved at all. With the appeals long since exhausted and the
aforementioned post-conviction motion having failed, we entered a
defense case in need of resuscitation.
" Team 4: A 1991 murder outside a nightclub stemming from a dis-
pute between two groups of teenagers. By means of suggestive po-
lice tactics, the defendant was identified in a photo array by one
witness, and multiple witnesses later testified against him at trial.
In the ensuing years, five prosecution witnesses recanted-citing
police and prosecutorial coercion as one of the factors in their false
testimony-and several criminal defense lawyers had undertaken
the case, most recently a former colleague of William Hellerstein
who had filed a federal habeas corpus petition and was awaiting a
decision from the Magistrate Judge about whether he would grant a
hearing. We agreed to help with the hearing if one was ordered.
In hindsight, and after de-briefing the students, it seems as though
Team 2 had the best educational experience in working on its case
throughout the year while Team 4 had the worst. Team 2 engaged in
extensive fact investigation by interviewing the defendant and the two
eyewitnesses, visiting the family of the suspected perpetrator (who
was incarcerated for the other robberies), consulting with the defen-
dant's trial lawyer, and accompanying a private investigator on a can-
vass of the area. They utilized their legal writing skills by drafting
affidavits, and they conducted research about the potential issues in
the pending direct appeal. They also participated in many brain-
storming sessions about approaching the District Attorney's Office
and about whether to proceed with the appeal before filing a motion to
vacate the conviction based on newly discovered evidence or vice
versa. Although their stint in the clinic is over, both members of Team
2 have expressed a desire to continue working on the case and I envi-
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sion they might play a role in drafting the appellate brief if we do not
resolve the case through alternative avenues.
In contrast, Team 4's "investigation" consisted of a single meeting
with our co-counsel at which we determined that all of the necessary
legwork had been done and that, in essence, all we could do was wait
until the Magistrate Judge ruled. Team 4 was poised to find and pre-
pare the witnesses in the event of a hearing; however, the students
completed their tenure in the clinic before we even received a decision
from the court.173 We spent months trying to find Team 4 another
case to work on, but nothing especially attractive arose at the proper
time.
Team 1 appeared to have a mediocre educational experience. Its
case, seemingly full of promise at the beginning, became mired in a
series of negotiations with the co-defendant's attorney about strategy
and later with the District Attorney's Office, which agreed to launch
its own investigation. We had already met with the exculpatory eye-
witness prior to assigning the case to the students and there was little
for them to investigate, particularly considering our perception that
the case, the murder of a corrections officer, was politically volatile.
The contribution by the students on Team 1 was indeed significant,
including a helpful inventory and analysis of the police reports in the
case, yet their experience was largely passive; they were observers at
many meetings and seldom active participants, a result I attribute as
much to our unwillingness to relinquish command of the case as to
any failings in the case itself.
Objectively, Team 3 had the greatest triumph during the clinic's
first year-by the end of the fall semester, Team 3 had already helped
to garner the release of its client on parole-but it nowhere met this
level of success pedagogically. Shortly after assigning the case to the
students, we discovered the investigation was a non-starter; the leads
from seventeen years before had already been pursued or long since
dried up. Moreover, much of the exculpatory evidence in the case had
been presented during the previous post-conviction proceeding and,
therefore, was not "new." Shifting our attention to the parole process,
the students first conducted research (concerning the manner in
which outside parties could intervene before the Parole Board in New
York and what types of documents could be presented to it) and then
wrote the first draft of a document for submission to the Board.
Soon after the excitement of learning that the Board had opted to
release our client waned, we determined that continuing to work on
his case alone might not be a productive use of Team 3's resources: our
client was no longer in prison and the investigation had achieved
173. As fate would have it, in August 2002, the Magistrate Judge granted the request
for a hearing and we assigned a new team of students to help prepare for the
hearing in November 2002.
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nothing up to that point. Fortunately, an intriguing new case materi-
alized at the start of the spring semester and we assigned it to Team
3.174 Again, this case was older (an intra-prison homicide from 1986)
and the bulk of the investigation had already been completed or was
in the process of being completed by the attorney who had brought the
case to us and with whom we had established a co-counsel relation-
ship. It took time for Team 3 to gain familiarity with the trial and
various appeals in this new case, but ultimately their understanding
of the record proved instrumental in revising post-conviction papers
that were filed with the lower court in the summer of 2002.
Overall, my impression is that only one of the four student teams
(Team 2) had a truly stimulating and educationally rewarding experi-
ence solely through its work on an innocence case that we had
preselected for representation. The experiences of Teams 1 and 3
were mixed and, for Team 4, highly disappointing. Some of the cases
(Team 4) never got off the ground while others (Team 1) became
fraught with complexity and the involvement of too many lawyers, in
effect, grounding the students before they could take flight. Frank
Bloch has observed how the complexity of a certain case might make
students "effectively distanced" from the actual representation.1 7 5 In
a sense, I noticed similar distancing by students in the Second Look
Program Clinic-I think due in part not only to the complexity of the
cases but also to our discomfort with non-directive supervision.
17 6
The stakes simply felt too high to cease intervening and dictating
strategy except when necessary. Speaking for myself, I often rational-
ized my tendency for intervention by recalling these stakes and my
belief that any misstep could prove fatal to the inmate's claim.
In retrospect, I feel I could have been much less directive without
sacrificing the viability of the cases and, going forward, I intend to act
upon this sentiment. Still, the reality is that innocence cases are often
intricate, protracted, and politically sensitive, suggesting that faculty
intervention, either actual or potential, to some extent may be an om-
nipresent cloud over student autonomy.
174. Upon reflection, we should have perhaps assigned this case to Team 4. At that
point in the year, we were still hopeful, though not optimistic, that the Magis-
trate Judge would order a hearing on the federal habeas corpus petition and that
Team 4's services would be in demand. Meanwhile, we felt compelled to give
Team 3 an active case.
175. Bloch, supra note 141, at 352.
176. The struggle to "shed the advocate's desire to control the situation" appears to be
a common problem for supervisors in a new law school clinic. Kreiling, supra
note 119, at 301; see also Quigley, supra note 119.
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2. Student Participation in the Case Selection Process: A
Potential Pedagogical Treasure Trove
At first out of necessity and later out of choice, we decided the case
selection process could provide a constructive pedagogical experience
for students in the Second Look Program Clinic and assigned a hand-
ful of prisoner inquiries to each individual student as opposed to
teams.177 The necessity flowed from the overwhelming volume of in-
quiries we had received; simply put, we needed student labor in this
realm. The choice evolved over the course of the year when we noticed
how excited the students were about the process, how effective they
were in conducting it, and how they appeared to be improving their
assessment skills over time in contrast to the inconclusive educational
benefits of their work on the preselected cases. Individual participa-
tion in the case selection process entailed many of the skills cited in
the MacCrate Report and by the AALS Committee on the Future of
the In-House Clinic, including developing modes of analysis and plan-
ning in unstructured situations, fact investigation, and written and
oral communication.178 And, at the same time that students appeared
to fortify their practical skills through screening cases, they also
demonstrated boosts in confidence;17 9 in fact, some students assumed
responsibility for numerous cases and became quite vocal in opining
about their merits.
From our vantage point as supervisors, case selection became a ve-
hicle to try on our non-directive training wheels; we found solace in
our belief that the stakes were somewhat lower in allowing students
to have autonomy in the preselection phaseXSO and in observing that
the students almost uniformly displayed keen judgment about the va-
lidity of a claim. The perception that students seemed to be thriving
in their case selection work also alleviated some of the pressure we felt
to find prepackaged, interesting cases of actual innocence for students
to work on for fear that they otherwise would not be getting what they
had expected.
177. At most law school innocence projects, students appear to be heavily involved in
reviewing inmate inquiries. Stiglitz et al., supra note 3, at 425 (mentioning that
students in the California Innocence Project are responsible for approximately
twenty-five files apiece). Not every project follows this model; for instance, the
case selection process at the Innocence Project at Cardozo is handled primarily by
full-time staff members.
178. See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
179. Although the supervisors at the California Innocence Project "think the screening
process provides a great educational benefit," they note that students "sometimes
get depressed by the work" for several reasons, including the obvious guilt of
many potential clients and the fact that "[s]logging through files is not particu-
larly glamorous." Stiglitz et al., supra note 3, at 424. We did not detect much
gloom among our students regarding case selection, perhaps because we did not
ask them to review a significant number of files during the year.
180. See supra section II.C.
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Granted, it would be disingenuous to imply that we awarded pri-
mary responsibility for the case selection process to our students with-
out any direction whatsoever. As described above,i18 the formulation
and execution of our case selection procedure carries with it an ele-
ment of directiveness. First, we had predetermined the intake criteria
before involving students in the process, so inherently our case selec-
tion structure shows directiveness on our part; we set the rules and
then asked students to play the game.' 8 2 Second, we maintained con-
trol of the initial "A"-"B" letter assessment, primarily because it
seemed inefficient and rather unfair to mete out this largely ministe-
rial task to students.' 8 3 Third, although students had far-reaching
autonomy in reviewing the "B" files and writing the Evaluation Memo-
randa, their preliminary prognoses were subject to our second opinion;
thus, while the proposed course of action for a case was student-gener-
ated, the final decision of whether to follow that course was made col-
laboratively with faculty input. Fourth, we eased students into the
process by providing them with both an introductory memorandum
describing what to look for, namely, our intake criteria, and a copy of
an Evaluation Memorandum that I had drafted for use as a sample. 8 4
That being said, our students eventually had an impact on the
makeup of our case selection process in several ways, including the
policy change to request appellate briefs at the questionnaire stage.18 5
Notwithstanding that the specific manner in which students partici-
pate in case selection continues to be refined, their extensive involve-
ment in this area of our work seems to have many pedagogical
advantages.
The primary educational benefit relates to experiential learning
and the supervisory process. In light of the tension between the pre-
ferred clinical method of non-directive supervision and the demands of
client service, a faculty member's decision to intervene in a matter
181. See supra subsection II.B.2.
182. Some directiveness is implicit in the formation of a clinic itself, such as determin-
ing what kinds of cases to handle (subject matter, complexity) and which specific
clients to represent. See Stark et al., supra note 120, at 38. Schrag suggests that,
at least in a "clinic's first year, supervisors could include students in making deci-
sions on intake policy as a way of teaching them about client needs and policy-
making in a legal office." Schrag, supra note 15, at 231. This might also enable
students "to feel more responsibility for the clinic as an institution." Id.
183. Although we have a separate Second Look Program Clinic office at the law school,
mail from inmates is routed to one of our faculty offices. This process allows us to
keep track of the correspondence and to make prompt initial assessments.
184. This introductory memorandum mentioned our intake criteria, but it did not offer
suggestions as to how students should actually proceed to review their "B" files.
By presenting limited guidance regarding the evaluative process itself, I hoped to
counteract the directive tone set by simply providing a description of our criteria
and a copy of an Evaluation Memorandum.
185. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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often sends a "mixed message" to students.186 Specifically, this fric-
tion between telling students to run with a case and the penchant of
supervisors to put the brakes on later can create a destructive, co-de-
pendent relationship and detract from the students' learning.18 7 In
the innocence project context, the professional obligations to the in-
mate are arguably limited prior to accepting a case for representation
and, therefore, the supervisor may not feel-and, in fact, may not be-
as duty-bound to intervene as in cases that the clinic has already for-
mally agreed to handle.1 88 Moreover, there might be less of a practi-
cal need to intervene as gaffes in evaluating a claim or hatching a
preliminary investigation plan can be more easily remedied at this
stage than at a later juncture. In turn, without the presence of a pro-
fessional duty (and the sense of practical urgency), supervisors may
feel better able to send a clear message to students that they bear
responsibility for a matter in the screening pipeline and may be in a
better position to adhere to this message. Unimpeded by excessive
faculty supervision or the threat of such, students can ideally learn
from their own experiences in wading through the muddy waters of
case selection, fulfilling the maxim of clinical pedagogy that experien-
tial learning is the most effective form of learning.
Allowing students to have significant autonomy in the innocence
project case selection process alone, though, is not enough to ensure
that students will actually learn from their experience: a system that
gives students wide control over case selection should be coupled with
a sliding scale of directive supervision over the course of the clinic and
an effort to teach self-reflection. We provided our students in the Sec-
ond Look Program Clinic with information about our intake criteria
and a sample (not model) Evaluation Memorandum at the outset to
preempt their potential frustration with divining how to perform the
task on their own.1 8 9 To address the potential problem of dependency,
186. See Tarr, supra note 131, at 973-74 (discussing how supervisors may nurture stu-
dent dependence by giving mixed messages).
187. The propensity of some students to want to be spoon-fed information by supervi-
sors may exacerbate this problem. Id. at 972-78 (noting the phenomenon of stu-
dents feeling dependent and supervisors subconsciously wanting students to rely
on them, creating co-dependency).
188. See supra section II.C. For purposes of full disclosure, I acknowledge that I am
not entirely comfortable with the notion that innocence projects assume few pro-
fessional obligations to inmates prior to the actual representation stage, but I do
feel that those obligations are significantly less extensive than upon formation of
an attorney-client relationship.
189. Kreiling has observed that at the beginning of a clinical course "[w]ithout the
basic understanding required to formulate coherent 'theories of action,' students
are forced to go through the educationally inefficient and highly discouraging
route of muddling through the task ... the fieldwork supervisor or a classroom
teacher must provide the basic information necessary to initiate the process of
learning from experience." Kreiling, supra note 119, at 306-07; see also Hoffman,
supra note 129, at 304 (suggesting supervisors ought to provide precise instruc-
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that students might be wary of shouldering responsibility for their
own files, we tried to make our objectives explicit-that each file as-
signed to a student for screening "belonged" to that student and that
they should be prepared to assess the case, devise a plan of action for
the preliminary investigation (if deemed necessary), and defend their
assessment and investigative strategy. In addition to making these
objectives explicit, we endeavored to abide by them throughout the
year, and I think we managed to do so.
Initially tentative and reliant upon our guidance in making ap-
praisals of inmate inquiries, the students, with one or two exceptions,
gradually became more decisive in their case evaluations and more
assertive in crafting theories of action for the preliminary investiga-
tions. In particular, many students during the fall semester seemed
hesitant to recommend rejecting a case outright, likely because of a
lack of confidence and a dread of feeling accountable for denying an
inmate's plea for help.190 By the spring semester, many students
were far less timid, frequently sanctioning rejection letters, yet never
to the point where I felt they had strayed too far in the other direction
and become overly cynical. Rather, their assessment skills appeared
more finely attuned and their egos less in need of affirmation. This
growth in confidence seemingly coincided with the loosening of the su-
pervisory reins over case selection during the span of the year. In es-
sence, I noticed an evolution in the supervisory relationship with
students in the case selection sphere that resembled the stages de-
scribed by Hoffman,191 whereas this development was markedly less
pronounced with respect to their work on the cases that we had
preselected for representation.1 92 Furthermore, through their work in
evaluating "B" files and, when appropriate, devising preliminary in-
vestigation strategies, students seemed to improve a number of con-
crete skills:
" The process of organizing the file, untangling the procedural chro-
nology, and discerning the nature of the inmate's claim helped with
fact investigation and often encouraged students to engage in legal
research to understand the inmate's situation more fully.
* Drafting the Evaluation Memoranda bolstered the students' writing
skills.
tions together with the underlying rationale for each direction at the beginning
stage of a clinic).
190. See Caplow, supra note 19, at 26 ("[M]aybe students actually restrain themselves
more than experienced lawyers do because they have not yet developed a sense of
the limits of their lawyering ability so they err on the side of caution.").
191. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
192. For instance, both members of Team 1 seemed to remain tentative in their work
on the 1991 murder case, but became much more assertive in their case selection
activities.
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" Formulating a preliminary investigation plan, in cases that stu-
dents decided not to reject, served to develop problem solving
skills. 193
" The preliminary investigation itself often encompassed fact investi-
gation as well as writing (client letters, Freedom of Information Act
requests, etc.) and oral communication (contacting witnesses and
the inmate's former attorneys to discuss the case). 19 4
* The case selection process prompted important ethical questions,19 5
enabling students to confront problems of professional responsibil-
ity for which there were not always clear-cut solutions.
Case selection for an innocence project also provides a suitable
means to teach students about self-reflection. As noted above, the pre-
vailing wisdom in clinical circles is that experiences are most educa-
tional when repeated and reflected upon, with supervisors using
assorted tactics for achieving this pattern of self-reflection.196 Per-
forming a lawyering task, stepping back to assess that performance
193. The MacCrate Report cited five chief elements of problem-solving: "identifying
and diagnosing a problem, generating alternative solutions and strategies, devel-
oping a plan of action, implementing the plan, and keeping the planning process
open to new information and ideas." See MacCrate Report, supra note 124, at
142-48. The process of selecting cases for an innocence project, by its very nature,
entails these five components, starting with the student's identification of the
inmate's claim to creating an investigation plan to executing that plan.
194. Our students did not generally interview prospective clients as part of the case
selection process, partially because of the logistics involved in arranging visits to
distant prisons and fears about raising the prisoner's expectations at a prelimi-
nary stage. When I presented a draft of this Article at the Clinical Theory Work-
shop at New York Law School in the fall of 2002, several participants observed
that worrying excessively about raising expectations on the part of the potential
client might be somewhat paternalistic and that the benefits of these visits (expe-
rience for the students, filling in the blanks to the inmate's claim) might often
outweigh the detriments (time and money). In the future, I hope to include more
of these visits to develop the students' skills and assist us in making our determi-
nations, especially in close cases. See Jennifer Martin, Humanizing the Post-Con-
viction Appellate Process: A Student's Perspective, INNOCENCE Q. (N. Cal.
Innocence Project/Santa Clara Univ., Santa Clara, Cal.), Fall 2002, at 3 ("In the
post-conviction work I have done thus far, I've waded through cold transcripts,
lists of physical evidence, complex and sometimes cumbersome briefs, and ver-
bose opinions involving varied interpretations of the law. This work has been
blind, blind to emotion and life.... Interviewing the convicted may help bring life
back into the process.").
195. See supra section II.C.
196. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text. Brook Baker contends that expe-
rience is most educational when it is repeated, varied, ability-appropriate, and
valued by others in the workplace. Brook K. Baker, Beyond MacCrate: The Role
of Context, Experience, Theory, and Reflection in Ecological Learning, 36 ARIz. L.
REV. 287, 324-32 (1994); Caplow, supra note 19, at 48. Kreiling proposes an ideal
"supervision cycle" of six stages, including pre- and post-performance confer-
ences, and suggests that this cycle should be repeated multiple times during a
student's clinical experience. See Kreiling, supra note 119, at 318-36.
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critically, and then undertaking the same task again-this time in-
formed by the assessment-accelerates a student's development of
practical lawyering skills.197 Self-evaluation compels students to be
more responsible for their own education both in the clinic (the short-
run) and later as practitioners (the long-run).198
By compartmentalizing the clinical experience into digestible case
screening chunks, there were ample opportunities to meet with indi-
vidual students in the Second Look Program Clinic and embark on a
feedback cycle.19 9 Based on informal consultations with students, my
sense is that it took anywhere from two to ten hours for them to re-
view a "B" file and draft an Evaluation Memorandum, depending upon
the clarity of the questionnaire, both in terms of legibility and the lu-
cidity of the inmate's description of the incident, and whether the ap-
pellate briefs were already in the file. 200 After a student submitted an
Evaluation Memorandum, I would try to confer with her about how
she reached her prognosis (the process) and why she reached it (the
substance).2o1 These conferences gave me the chance, on which I did
not always capitalize, to explore some of the economic, cultural, and
ethical issues implicit in the prisoner inquiries and, concomitantly,
the students' own beliefs and attitudes as demonstrated by their eval-
uations of the prospective clients' problems. 20 2 By the end of these
conferences, the student and I had usually reached a mutually agreea-
ble decision about a course of action for the case, more often than not
the course initially prescribed in the student's Evaluation Memoran-
dum. Regardless of whether I agreed with the student's recommenda-
197. See supra note 196.
198. Tarr, supra note 131, at 969.
199. This opportunity was facilitated by the fact that we had only eight students and
two faculty supervisors, a good student-faculty ratio. Cf. Schrag, supra note 15,
at 187 (stating that as of the mid-1990s, the average student-faculty ratio for the
Georgetown Law School clinic was 7:1). In some ways, it may be easier to main-
tain a consciously non-directive method of supervision when a clinic enjoys a low
student-faculty ratio. See Stark et al., supra note 120, at 56 (discussing how they
expected non-directive clinicians to supervise fewer students because in those sit-
uations it would appear to be easier to give students broad authority without
harming client interests).
200. We initially did not require students to evaluate a precise number of cases and,
instead, merely told them to take on as many as they wanted; foreseeing that
some students would be busier than others with their active investigations, we
wanted the flexibility of having students delve into case selection to varying de-
grees. In our second year of operation, we decided to require that each student
review a minimum of six files during the fall 2002 semester.
201. During these meetings, students often focused on the substance of their deci-
sions, although I tried to steer the conversations toward the evaluative process as
well.
202. See Ziegler, supra note 131, at 579 ("Evaluation, in this context, means helping
students in uncovering assumptions, raising questions about the derivation and
purposes of their beliefs, and catalyzing discussion of underlying policy questions
inherent in the clients' particular problems.").
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tion, one of my goals was to help students critique their case
assessments and acquire greater self-awareness about their own deci-
sionmaking processes.
One explanation for the relatively successful results in involving
students in case selection activities for the Second Look Program
Clinic, and an argument in favor of the pedagogical value of affording
students independence in this area, is that the students felt owner-
ship over and, accordingly, responsibility for these "small" cases.
20 3
By bestowing control over specific "B" files to individual students and
vowing not to intervene in the preliminary assessment, we spurred
the student, in effect, to become the expert on a particular case in the
screening process, which altered the balance of power between stu-
dent and teacher.20 4 Also, because of the relatively short time frame
involved in determining whether a case might be appropriate for the
clinic and the fact that many inquiries were rejected fairly early on in
our case selection process,20 5 students could develop a sense of clo-
sure, of shepherding a case from start to finish.206 In short, a student
could feel like it was "her" case, an empowering proposition and a feel-
ing that students, for the most part, could not enjoy in regard to the
larger cases preselected for representation and assigned to teams.
To foster this goal of establishing student ownership of some por-
tion of an innocence project's activities, it may be helpful to assign
cases in the preselection phase to individual students, as we do, rather
than pairs. Clinicians have written about the pros and cons of distrib-
uting assignments to students operating in teams, noting that paired
students may learn more effectively because they teach and learn
from each other and, from the client's perspective, two heads are often
better than one. 20 7 Moreover, collaborating with a fellow student may
help prepare the nascent lawyer for the "work teams" that are fixtures
203. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
204. See Critchlow, supra note 121, at 435 ("A teacher's ability to improve on the per-
formance of a student will be limited by the degree to which the teacher lacks
relevant and specific information.").
205. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
206. Because the preliminary evaluation of an individual request for assistance is
rather self-contained and rarely takes inordinately long, this task can give stu-
dents a sense of satisfaction with completing a project. Duquette, supra note 64,
at 9 ("Students benefit the most when their cases are resolved, or at least pro-
gress significantly, during their term in the course."). There are few types of
cases that students can handle "from beginning to end, allowing them to experi-
ence, at the end of a case, the results of their decisionmaking and other work."
Schrag, supra note 15, at 194.
207. David F. Chavkin, Matchmaker, Matchmaker: Student Collaboration in Clinical
Programs, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 199, 204 (1994) (mentioning how the increased
knowledge generated by a pair can result in better work product); see also Schrag,
supra note 15, at 217-20.
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of contemporary legal practice2OS and may serve as a motivational de-
vice.20 9 Pairing students also allows each student to do less work on
the shared case, hypothetically freeing them up to do more thorough
work on that matter or have exposure to additional cases. 2 10 Still,
collaboration has its drawbacks. There may be interpersonal conflicts
within a student team, paralysis due to an unwieldy decisionmaking
structure and, on a mundane level, trouble in coordinating schedules
and so forth.211 These risks might not be worth taking in the context
of the innocence project case selection process because the task of re-
viewing any particular case file is somewhat finite and manageable for
one person, and assigning the cases on an individual basis might but-
tress the sense of ownership discussed above.
Furthermore, in the Second Look Program Clinic I found that allo-
cating "B" files to individual students for evaluation dovetailed nicely
with their teamwork on the "big" cases preselected for representation.
First, this "small case/big case" mix lent itself to a cross-fertilization of
experiences. Lessons gleaned from teamwork on a large case could be
applied toward assessing small cases; similarly, the knowledge drawn
from making unilateral case screening evaluations could be brought to
bear on the innocence claim that the clinic was actively pursuing. On
a macro-level, exposure to scores of less meritorious claims through
the screening process may have reinforced the rarity and importance
of the cases chosen for representation in the minds of our students
and, likewise, difficulties in investigating and litigating the active
cases may have impressed upon students that cases should not be ac-
cepted too readily. Second, just as work on the active cases may have
208. See, e.g., O'Grady, supra note 145 (arguing that collaborative pedagogy in the
clinical experience has the potential to prepare students for modern-day practice
with its swelling numbers of large law firms as well as conformance pressures).
In addition to collaborating with other students, clinics allow each student to col-
laborate with a senior lawyer, namely, the supervisor. O'Grady asserts that this
collaboration between student and supervisor may be unlike that ofjunior lawyer
and senior lawyer in practice because of the "clinical educator's efforts to main-
tain an optimal teaching environment, coupled with the students' assumption of
substantial responsibility for all aspects of case work and planning .... The di-
chotomy may leave students unprepared for the realities of collaborative work in
practice." Id. at 520; see also Susan Bryant, Collaboration in Law Practice: A
Satisfying and Productive Process for a Diverse Profession, 17 VT. L. REV. 459
(1993).
209. Peer pressure, especially the desire not to seem foolish in front of a classmate or
to overburden one's co-equal, may make members of a team more motivated. See
Schrag, supra note 15, at 217. Pairing students, though, does give each student a
safety net; as David Chavkin notes, "shared responsibility may mean reduced
responsibility." Chavkin, supra note 207, at 215.
210. See Schrag, supra note 15, at 218.
211. See Chavkin, supra note 207, at 219-27. Chavkin warns that having teams larger
than two students can aggravate certain problems and potentially deter the for-
mation of a proper attorney-client relationship. Id. at 242-43.
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enhanced the students' advocacy-related skills, involvement in case
selection served to hone their objective analytical skills, i.e., the abil-
ity to act as a "judge" in weighing the relative merits of a claim from a
neutral perspective. Third, through a clinical experience that pro-
ceeded on a dual track-working alone and in teams-the students
could preview the environments in which they will likely practice. 2 12
While much has been made about the growth of large law firms and
legal organizations in recent years, 213 many students still wind up as
solo practitioners or in very small partnerships where they will work
mainly on their own matters.2 14 Fourth, this balance between indi-
vidual and team-oriented work may have implicitly accommodated the
different learning styles of our students, some of whom appeared to
derive more from parsing through the issues in their "B" files largely
on their own, while others evidently flourished to a greater extent in
the give-and-take milieu of the student teams.
The greatest educational rewards may lie in forging a balance for
students between case selection activities and work on matters
preselected for representation. If case selection were the sole task per-
formed by students in an innocence project, then utilizing that same
skill set exclusively might soon reach a point of diminishing returns.
But if work on an active case comprised the entirety of the student
clinical experience in an innocence project, many students-including
the members of Team 4 in the Second Look Program Clinic-would
likely face profound disappointment.
The immersion of students into the case selection process as a focal
point of a law school clinic may be rather peculiar to innocence
projects. Clinicians often regard case selection to be the province of
the faculty alone in light of the significance of finding cases with a
high educational value.2 15 Also, the unique procedural posture of the
cases examined by innocence projects-at the end of the litigation
phase as opposed to the start-means there are few external time
pressures on case selection, save situations where the exculpatory evi-
dence might be in jeopardy or where the jurisdiction imposes a statute
212. See Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 149, at 9-10 (observing that clinics can afford
opportunities to experience interpersonal and group dynamics in settings where
an explicit aspiration is to analyze and discuss these dynamics).
213. See O'Grady, supra note 145, at 495 (discussing the growth of large, 100+ attor-
ney law firms since 1980 and the marked decrease of solo practitioners).
214. See NATIONAL ASS'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, JOBS & J.D.'s: EMPLOYMENT AND SALA-
RIES OF NEW LAW GRADUATES, CLASS OF 2001, at 28 (2002) ("Despite the publicity
surrounding large law firms, of the eight firm size categories tracked by NALP,
jobs in very small firms of 2-10 attorneys were the most common, accounting for
about 27% of law firm jobs taken by the Class of 2001.").
215. See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
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of limitations on post-conviction remedies. 216 To some degree, inno-
cence projects have both the flexibility (the luxury of selecting cases
without the burden of court appointments and many "hard and fast"
deadlines) and the incentive (the need to devote attention only to the
most meritorious claims, of which there may be few) to spend time
scouring prisoner inquiries and rendering exhaustive evaluations, a
job that students are well-equipped to conduct.
In sum, giving students significant freedom in the case selection
process can have an array of pedagogical benefits. It offers a poten-
tially effective medium for experiential learning about legal skills, in-
cluding fact investigation, planning and analysis, and communication.
It also provides a chance for students to develop the skill of self-reflec-
tion and have individual ownership over an aspect of the clinic's activ-
ities. Last but not least, student autonomy in this sphere can help to
offset a mediocre or even negative learning experience through work
on a preselected innocence claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
The practical and pedagogical considerations in selecting cases for
a new law school innocence project intersect with one another and to-
gether signal that extensive student involvement in the screening pro-
cess is warranted. Projects typically construct intake criteria and
procedures that achieve a balance between their objectives and re-
sources. Regardless of how narrowly a project defines its intake crite-
ria, it will undoubtedly be overwhelmed with inquiries to a point far
beyond the capability of faculty supervisors alone to evaluate them
adequately. Likewise, no matter how careful supervisors are in trying
to choose cases with perceived educational attributes for clinic stu-
dents, some of those efforts will likely go for naught given the unpre-
dictable path taken in litigating most innocence claims. In addition to
the institutional advantages of reducing the burden on a supervisor's
file cabinet, there are numerous pedagogical benefits to having stu-
dents bear responsibility for inquiries in the midst of the case selec-
tion process. Moreover, since many of the duties of professional
responsibility to a client attach only upon the onset of representation,
supervisors may be able to quell many of their directive impulses
when overseeing students engaged in the screening process and, in
turn, adhere to the normative view that students often learn best
when granted vast autonomy for a lawyering task.
Finally, integrating students into the case selection process may
prevent a project from losing sight of the humanitarian aspect of its
216. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. For instance, evidence might be at risk
if the key witnesses are in poor health or there is a chance that the biological
evidence from a case may be destroyed in the near future.
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mission in serving as a last resort for individuals in prison. A prisoner
whom the Second Look Program Clinic declined to represent recently
wrote me and declared that our rejection letter to him contained "an-
thrax" inasmuch as it conferred a "death sentence" upon him. Each
inquiry to an innocence project carries with it more than its factual
and legal assertions of innocence; it carries the hopes of a desperate
person. This is all the more reason for innocence projects to provide
thoughtful, thorough, and timely evaluations of requests for assis-
tance, work that may best be conducted by involving students in the
case selection process.
Many criminal defense lawyers suffer from cynicism about claims
of innocence and approach their cases with what might be called a
"Presumption of Guilt."217 The line between realist and cynic in crim-
inal defense is a fine one, and one that I am fearful of crossing as a
practitioner. With their fresh eyes, however, law students can look at
an inmate's claim through a prism uncluttered by years of represent-
ing guilty defendants and by past failures, situations where purport-
edly innocent clients turned out to be guilty, leaving some lawyers
feeling betrayed on an emotional level. 2 18 Even if, particularly at the
start of the year, our students tended to err on the side of caution in
their case selection evaluations, signifying their distance from the re-
alist-cynic divide, that seemed far better than the converse: to be par-
ticipants in the cycle of disregard and skepticism to which inmates
proclaiming innocence are accustomed throughout their experiences
in the criminal justice system and in response to which many inno-
cence projects were spawned.
217. See, e.g., Adele Bernhard, Effective Assistance of Counsel, in WRONGLY CON-
VICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 220, supra note 25, at 231-33 (discuss-
ing "the unacknowledged but pervasive belief of all participants in the criminal
justice system-even criminal defense attorneys-that anyone who has been ar-
rested is guilty").
218. In comparing the performance of student criminal defense attorneys against that
of institutional defenders based on results achieved and the nature and quality of
the lawyering, Steven Zeidman concluded that "[iun sharp contrast to institu-
tional defenders' 'patina of cynicism' and assumptions of their clients' guilt, stu-
dents approach their tasks with a high degree of enthusiasm and, often,
optimism." Steven Zeidman, Sacrificial Lambs or the Chosen Few?: The Impact
of Student Defenders on the Rights of the Accused, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 853, 899
(1996).
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